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I. INTRODUCTION
The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PSLRA"), 1 by
enacting the Securities Exchange Act ("Exchange Act") section 21D(b),2
resolves conflicts among the circuit courts regarding appropriate pleading
requirements in securities-fraud actions under section IO(b) of the
Exchange Act. 3 Section 21D(b)(l) provides that in any private action
under the Exchange Act based on allegedly false or misleading
statements, "the complaint shall specify each statement alleged to have
been misleading, [and} the reason or reasons why the statement is
misleading."4 Section 21D(b)(2) further provides that the complaint
must "state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that
the defendant acted with the required state of mind." 5 Together, these
provisions resolve conflicts among the circuits by adopting the Ninth
Circuit's requirements for pleading falsity and the Second Circuit's
requirements for pleading scienter in securities-fraud cases.
Section 2 lD(b )( 1) effectively codifies Ninth Circuit law interpreting
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b)'s provision requiring circumstances
constituting fraud to be alleged with particularity. 6 The Ninth Circuit's
en bane opinion in In re GlenFed Securities Litigation7 held that Rule
9(b) requires plaintiffs alleging fraud to explain how and why allegedly

I. Pub. L. No. l04-67, l09 Stat. 737 (l 995).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b) (1995).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1995).
4. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(l) (Supp. 1996) (emphasis added).
5. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (Supp. 1996) (emphasis added).
6. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b) ("In all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances
constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity.").
7. 42 F.3d 1541 (9th Cir. 1994) (en bane).
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fraudulent statements were false or misleading: "The plaintiff must set
forth what is false or misleading about a statement, and why it is false.
In other words, the plaintiff must set forth an explanation as to why the
statement or omission complained of was false or misleading." 8
Section 21D(b)(l) similarly requires plaintiffs to "specify each
statement alleged to have been misleading, [and] the reason or reasons
why the statement is misleading."9 GlenFed and section 21D(b)(l)
differ somewhat from the prior law in other circuits, which did not
always require plaintiffs to specify the content of statements or to allege
evidentiary facts showing how and why they were misleading. 10
Section 21D(b)(l) thus strengthens the pleading standard for alleging
false or misleading statements by adopting the Ninth Circuit standard for
pleading falsity. 11
Section 21D(b)(2), on the other hand, adopts the Second Circuit's
standard for pleading scienter. Since the late 1970s, Second Circuit
decisions have required plaintiffs alleging fraud to raise "a strong
inference" of scienter, 12 which can be done by alleging "motive and
opportunity" or by alleging "facts constituting circumstantial evidence
of either reckless or conscious behavior." 13 Other courts---including the
Ninth Circuit in G/enFed-rejected the Second Circuit's "strong
inference" standard, holding that under Rule 9(b) plaintiffs cannot be
required to plead facts to support conclusory allegations of fraudulent
intent or recklessness. 14 Section 21D(b)(2) resolves a conflict among
the circuits, for Exchange Act cases at least, by requiring plaintiffs to
"state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the
defendant acted with the required state of mind." 15

8. G/enFed, 42 F.3d at 1548; see also Fecht v. Price Co., 70 F.3d 1078, 1082-83
(9th Cir. 1995).
9. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(l) (Supp. 1996).
I 0. See infra notes 55, 60 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 20-28 and accompanying text.
12. See infra note 8 I and accompanying text.
13. In re Time Warner, Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 269 (2d Cir. 1993), see infra
notes 81-83, and accompanying text.
14. See i,ifra notes 52-54, and accompanying text. In G/enFed, for example, the
Ninth Circuit flatly rejected Second Circuit Jaw, GlenFed, 42 F.3d at 1545-47, holding
"that plaintiffs may aver scienter generally, just as the rule states---that is, simply by
saying that scienter existed." Id. at 1547.
15. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (Supp. 1996) (emphasis added).
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Section 21D(b)(2) scrupulously avoids any implication that it alters the
standard for what actually constitutes scienter under the Exchange Act,
allowing plaintiffs to raise "a strong inference that the defendant acted
with the required state of mind." 16 Congress knew that "the required
state of mind" for a section 10(b) violation was knowledge of falsity or
recklessness. 17 With another section of the PSLRA, it raised the
required state of mind to "actual knowledge of falsity" for certain
"forward-looking" statements. 18 With a new Exchange Act section
21D(g), Congress imposed limitations on joint-and-several liability for
reckless conduct, warning that "[n]othing in this subsection shall be
construed to create, affect, or in any manner modify, the standard for
liability associated with any action arising under the securities laws." 19
Thus, under section 21D(b)(2), "the required state of mind" is actual
knowledge for section 10(b) violations based entirely on specified
forward-looking statements, and knowledge or recklessness for all other
types of statements or representations.
On its face, then, section 21D(b) imposes a uniform national pleading
standard that is stronger than that which had existed in either the Second
Circuit or the Ninth Circuit. It adopts GlenFed's approach to pleading
falsity with particularity, but opts for the Second Circuit's "strong
inference" standard for pleading state of mind, without altering "the
required state of mind" for a section 10(b) violation.
Nonetheless, in the first cases filed under the PSLRA, defense counsel
invoked the PSLRA's legislative history to argue that section 21D(b)
does something very different from what its text says. They argued that,
far from adopting the Second Circuit's "strong inference" test for
pleading scienter, Congress really intended with section 21D(b)(2) to
impose a new and untested standard for pleading scienter that is more
demanding than Second Circuit case law and that cannot be satisfied
with allegations of motive and opportunity, or with allegations of
reckless misconduct. 20 Some have gone so far as to argue that section

16. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(b)(2) (Supp. 1996) (emphasis added).
17. See infra notes 132-44 and accompanying text.
18. With a new Exchange Act section 21E, Congress provided that for certain
narrowly-defined "forward-looking statements," 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(b) (i) (1995), made
by specified persons under certain conditions, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(a)(b)(l), the required
state of mind shall be "actual knowledge" that a statement is false or misleading. 15
U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(l)(B)(1995).
19. 15 U.S.C. §78u-4(g) (1995).
20. See Reply Mem. in Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss at 4-5,
Marksman Partners L.P. v. Chantal Pharmaceutical Corp., (C.D. Cal. 1996) (No. 960872-WJR(JRx)); Petition Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1292(b) for Permission to Appeal
Certified Interlocutory Order, at 13-16, Marksman Partners, L.P. v. Chantal Pharmaceutical Corp., 9th Cir. No. 96-80170 (June 3, 1996); Motion to Dismiss Complaint and
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21D(b) implicitly abolishes liability for reckless misconduct in private
actions under the Exchange Act, even for non-forward-looking
statements. 21
The first reported decisions under the PSLRA sensibly rejected such
contentions. Marksman Partners, L.P. v. Chantal Pharmaceutical
Corp. 22 did so explicitly with a scholarly opinion flatly rejecting
contentions that section 21D(b) overrides the Second Circuit "strong
inference" standard or abolished liability for recklessness. 23 Zeid v.
Kimberly2 4 ignored defendants' arguments that the Second Circuit case
law had been superseded and evaluated the complaint under Second
Circuit precedents allowing plaintiffs to raise "a strong inference" with
allegations of "facts constituting circumstantial evidence of either
reckless or conscious behavior" or "facts 'establishing a motive to
commit fraud and an opportunity to do so. "'25 Yet a third decision, In

Supporting Memo at 14-15 (March 18, 1996), and Reply Mem. in Support of Motion to
Dismiss, at 16 n.7 (May I, 1996), Zeid v. Kimberly, N.D. Cal. No. C-96-20136
SW(PVT); see also Stephen F. Black, et. al., The Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995: A Preliminary Analysis, 24 SEC. REG. L. J. 117, 134-37 (1996); Walter Reiman,
et al., The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act: A User's Guide, 24 SEC. REG. L.
J. 143, 163-66 (1996).
21. Petition Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1292(b) for Permission to Appeal Certified
Interlocutory Order, at I 6-19, Marksman Partners v. Chantal Pharmaceutical Corp., 9th
Cir. No. 96-80170 (June 3, 1996).
22. 927 F. Supp. 1297 (C.D. Cal. 1996),petition to appeal denied, No. 96-80170
(9th Cir. June 28, 1996) (order denying petition for permission to appeal under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(b)).
23. Id. at 1308-12; see generally Alan Schulman, Eric Isaacson & Jennifer Wells,
Pleading Standards Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995: The
Central District of California 's Chantal Decision, CLASS ACTIONS & DERIVATIVE SUITS,
Summer 1996, at 14, 15-18; Michael A. Perino, A Strong Inference ofFraud? An Early
Interpretation of the 1995 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, I SEC. REFORM ACT
LmG. REP. 397, 397-401 (1996); Patrick J. Coughlin & Eric A. Isaacson, Commencing
Litigation Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PSLRA "), in
SECURJTIES LITIGATION 1996 9, 4-19 (Jay B. Kasner & Bruce G. Vanyo, eds. 1996).
24. 930 F. Supp. 431 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
25. Id. at 437-38 (quoting Time Warner, 9 F.3d at 269). Although the district
court correctly used Second Circuit standards to evaluate the complaint in Zeid, we
believe it erred in holding that the complaint did not meet the standard of the Second
Circuit precedents. In another case, this one filed before the PSLRA took effect, a
district court cites the PSLRA as "codifying the Second Circuit standard for pleading
scienter" that the court proceeds to apply. Sloane Overseas Fund, Ltd v. Sapiens
International Corp., No. 95 Civ. 9165 (RPP), 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12104, at *23
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 1996).
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re Silicon Graphics Securities Litigation,26 has departed from Marksman Partners and Zei<J21 to hold that section 21D(b) both abolishes
liability for recklessness and demands substantially more than the Second
Circuit's "strong inference" standard. 28
In her Silicon Graphics opinion, Judge Fem M. Smith relies on
President Clinton's interpretation of a cryptic sentence and an endnote
in the Statement of the Managers accompanying the Conference Report
on the PSLRA. 29 The Statement of the Managers stated that "[b]ecause
the Conference Committee intends to strengthen existing pleading
requirements, it does not intend to codify the Second Circuit's case law
interpreting this pleading standard."30 "For this reason," an endnote
added, "the Conference Report chose not to include in the pleading
standard certain language relating to motive, opportunity, or recklessness. "31 Although President Clinton endorsed the legislation '.I' text for
adopting the Second Circuit's "strong inference" pleading standard, he
nonetheless vetoed the bill, arguing that "the conferees make crystal
clear in the Statement of the Managers their intent to raise the standard
even beyond that level. " 32
"Further emphasizing its 'crystal clear intent' to heighten the pleading
standard," wrote Judge Smith in Silicon Graphics, "Congress overrode
the veto." 33 "Thus, in order to state a private securities claim," she
concluded, "plaintiff must now allege . . . how the statements are false

26. No. C 96-0393 FMS (C.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 1996) (order dismissing complaint
with leave to amend certain allegations).
27. Id. at 13 n.4 ("The Court respectfully disagrees with the opinions in Zeid v.
Kimberly and Marksman Partners, L.P. v. Chantal Pharmaceutical Corp., which interpret
The [PSLRA] as adopting the Second Circuit standard.") (citations omitted).
28. Id. at I 0-16. Although the decision in Silicon Graphics was rendered after this
article was accepted for publication, we have tried to take account of it with last-minute
revisions. With these revisions we have also added citations to two articles published
by academic commentators after this article was accepted for publication. See John C.
Coffee, The Future of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act: Or, Why the Fat
Lady Has Not Yet Sung, 51 Bus. LAW. 975, 977-85 (1996); Michael A. Perrino, A
Strong Inference of Fraud? An Early Interpretation of the 1995 Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act, I SEC. REFORM ACT LJTIG. REP. 397, 402-05 (1996).
29. In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Sec Litig., No. C96-0393FMS, slip op. at 11-13
(N.D. Cal. Sep. 25, 1996).
30. H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-369, at 41 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N.
730, 740.
31. Id. at 48 n.23, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 747 n.23.
32. President's Message to House of Representatives Returning Without Approval
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, WKLY. COMP. PRES. Doc. 2210
(Dec. 19, 1995).
33. Silicon Graphics, slip op. at 12.
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or misleading, and create a strong inference of knowing misrepresentation on the part of the defendants." 34
The Silicon Graphics interpretation of section 21D(b) is untenable.
Where the text of a statute is clear, courts should not resort to legislative
history-much less to the views of opponents of the legislation--in order
to contradict it. 35 The text of section 21D(b) is clear, and nothing in
it suggests that when Congress adopted the Second Circuit's "strong
inference" formulation, it really meant to impose an even stronger
standard for allegations of scienter. Nor does anything in it suggest that
Congress intended to overrule the case law that framed, defined, and
interpreted the very words Congress chose to adopt. Further, nothing in
section 21 D(b) suggests that "the required state of mind" for a section
lO(b) always requires knowing, rather than reckless, conduct.
Nonetheless, Silicon Graphics adopts an erroneous interpretation of
section 21D(b)'s legislative history, relying on the views of a President
who opposed the legislation and imputing them to a Congress that
rejected those views when it overrode his veto. 36 A careful review of
the legislative history of section 21D(b)(2) shows that Congress intended
to adopt the "strong-inference" pleading standard from Second Circuit
case law and to leave courts free to seek guidance from the existing
precedents whenever appropriate. 37 Indeed, the legislative history
shows that the bill's leading proponents intended for allegations of
motive, opportunity, and recklessness to raise a strong inference of
scienter under section 21D(b)(2). 38 Congress overrode President
Clinton's veto because it believed he was wrong in thinking the
Statement of Managers demanded more than Second Circuit case law
required. 39
Moreover, nothing in the legislative history suggests that Congress
intended to change the scienter standard for section 1O(b) violations not
involving forward-looking statements. Although initial drafts of the
legislation required plaintiffs to plead and prove "that the defendant
knew the statement was misleading at the time it was made, or
intentionally omitted to state a fact knowing that such omission would
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id. at 16 (emphasis added).
See infra notes 328-34 and accompanying
See infra notes 345-67 and accompanying
Id.
See infra notes 356-67 and accompanying
See infra notes 345-67 and accompanying

text.
text.
text.
text.
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render misleading the statements made at the time they were made,''4°
such a requirement was removed---except with respect to "forwardlooking statements.',4 1
In short, section 21D(b) adopts a uniform national standard for
pleading securities-fraud claims that is based on existing pleading
standards from the Ninth Circuit for pleading falsity, and from the
Second Circuit on how plaintiffs may raise "a strong inference" of
sci enter.
IL

THE TEXT

A.

The Text and Structure of Section 2JD(b) and
Related Provisions in the PSLRA

AND

HISTORY OF SECTION 21D(b)

Enacted as part of the PSLRA, Exchange Act section 21D(b) restates
the pleading standards for Exchange Act securities-fraud actions. 42 But
the pleading standards are not new. Subsection (b )( 1) restates a pleading
rule developed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b),43 which the
Ninth Circuit construed to require complaints alleging fraud not only to
identify the statements alleged to be misleading, but also to explain how
or why those statements were misleading. 44 Subsection (b)(2) restates
the requirement, developed in the Second Circuit, that a complaint
alleging fraud should set forth facts raising a "strong inference" of

40.
41.
42.

H.R. I 0, § 204 ( 1995) (emphasis added).
See infra notes 328-33 and accompanying text.
Exchange Act section 21 D(b) provides:
(b) Requirements for Securities Fraud Actions. (I) Misleading statements and omissions. - In any private action arising
under this title in which the plaintiff alleges that the defendant (A) made an untrue statement of a material fact; or
(B) omitted to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in the light of the circumstances in which they were
made, not misleading;
the complaint shall specify each statement alleged to have been misleading, the reason or reasons why the statement is misleading, and, if an
allegation regarding the statement or omission is made on information and
belief, the complaint shall state with particularity all facts on which that
belief is formed.
(2) Required state of mind. - In any private action arising under this title
in which the plaintiff may recover money damages only on proof that the
defendant acted with a particular state of mind, the complaint shall, with
respect to each act or omission alleged to violate this title, state with
particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted
with the required state of mind.
15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(l)-(2) (1995).
43. See FED. R. Crv. P. 9(b).
44. See infra notes 48-54 and accompanying text.
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scienter. 45 By combining the two rules, Congress created a new,
stronger pleading standard that comprises the Second Circuit's standard
for pleading scienter and the Ninth Circuit's standard for pleading
falsity.

1.

Section 21D(b)(l) s Standard for Pleading Falsity

Section 21D(b)(l) states that in any Exchange Act case based on
misleading statements, "the complaint shall specify each statement
alleged to have been misleading, the reason or reasons why the
statement is misleading, and, if an allegation regarding the statement ...
is made on information and belief, the complaint shall state with
particularity all facts on which that belief is formed."46 This is,
undoubtedly, a codification of case law applying Rule 9(b)'s provision
that "[i]n all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity."47 It is, in fact,
a codification of the Ninth Circuit standard for pleading falsity which
applies Rule 9(b ), to require plaintiffs alleging fraud to specify the
substance of what was said, along with some explanation of why the
statements were misleading.48
The Ninth Circuit's Rule 9(b) precedents held that a complaint
alleging fraud "must state precisely the time, place, and nature of the
misleading statements, misrepresentations, and specific acts of fraud,"
and that '"the allegations should include the misrepresentations
themselves with particularity and, where possible, the roles of the
individual defendants in the misrepresentations. "'49 With an en bane
decision in In re GlenFed Sec. Litig., 50 the Ninth Circuit clarified its
requirement that plaintiffs explain how a statement is false:
The time, place, and content of an alleged misrepresentation may identify the
statement or the omission complained of, but these circumstances do not

45. See infra notes 72-85 and accompanying text.
46. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(I) (1995) (emphasis added).
47. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).
48. See, e.g., Warshaw v. Xoma Corp., 74 F.3d 955, 960 (9th Cir. 1996); Fecht v.
Price Co., 70 F.3d 1078, 1082-83 (9th Cir. 1995); In re GlenFed, Inc. Sec. Litig., 42
F.3d 1541, 1548 (9th Cir. 1994) (en bane); Kaplan v. Rose, 49 F.3d 1363, 1370 (9th Cir.
1994); Moore v. Kayport Package Express, Inc., 885 F.2d 531, 540 (9th Cir. 1989).
49. Kaplan v. Rose, 49 F.3d 1363, 1370 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting Moore v. Kayport
Package Express, Inc., 885 F.2d 531, 540 (9th Cir. 1989)).
50. 42 F.3d 1541, 1548 (9th Cir. 1994) (en bane).
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"constitute" fraud. The statement in question must be false to be fraudulent.
Accordingly, our cases have consistently required that circumstances indicating
falseness be set forth . . . . To allege fraud with particularity, a plaintiff must
set forth more than the neutral facts necessary to identify the transaction. The
plaintiff must set forth what is false or misleading about a statement, and why
it is false. In other words, the plaintiff must set forth an explanation as to why
the statement or omission complained of was false or misleading. A plaintiff
might do less and still identify the statement complained of; indeed, the plaintiff
might do less and still set forth some of the circumstances of the fraud. But the
plaintiff cannot do anything less and still comply with Rule 9(b )'s mandate to
set forth with particularity those circumstances which constitute the fraud. 51

In GlenFed, the court rejected objections that plaintiffs cannot be
required to plead evidentiary facts to show falsity, explaining that "Rule
9(b) requires particularity as to the circumstances of the fraud---this
requires pleading facts that by any definition are 'evidentiary': time,
place, persons, statements made, ex}?1anation of why or how such
statements are false or misleading." 2 Hence, "GlenFed requires a
plaintiff to plead evidentiary facts and the court to consider what
inferences these facts will support."53 Under GlenFed, "a plaintiff may
'draw on contemporaneous statements or conditions' to demonstrate why
statements were false when made," and "allegations of specific problems
undermining a defendant's optimistic claims suffice to explain how the
claims are false." 54
However, other federal courts did not consistently construe Rule 9(b)
to demand such particularized pleading of misrepresentations and reasons
for falsity. 55 Some Second Circuit decisions, such as Cosmas v.
Hassett, 56 imposed a similar pleading standard, stating that a complaint
alleging fraud "must adequately specify the statements it claims were
false or misleading and give particulars as to the res~ect in which
plaintiffs contend the statements were fraudulent ...." 7 But others
held that "[t]o pass muster under rule 9(b), the complaint must allege the
time, place, speaker, and sometimes even the content of the alleged
51. Id. (emphasis added).
52. Id. at 1547-48 n.7.
53. Fecht v. Price Co., 70 F.3d 1078, 1082 (9th Cir. 1982); see Warshaw v. Xoma
Corp., 74 F.3d 955,960 (9th Cir. 1996) ("In GlenFed we explained that a plaintiff must
plead evidentiary facts that support inferences sufficient to meet the specificity
requirements of Rule 9(b)."); Fecht, 70 F.3d at 1082.
54. Id. at 1083 (quoting In re GlenFed, Inc. Sec. Litig., 42 F.3d 1541, 1549) (9th
Cir. I994); see Warshaw v. Xoma Corp., 74 F.3d 955, 960 (9th Cir. I996).
55. Compare Seville Indus. Mach. Corp. v. Southmost Mach. Corp., 742 F.2d 786,
791 (3d Cir. 1984) ("It is certainly true that allegations of 'date, place or time' fulfill
[Rule 9(b)'s requirements], but nothing in the rule requires them.")(emphasis added).
56. 886 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1989).
57. Id. at II; see also Mills v. Polar Molecular Corp., 12 F.3d 1170, I I 75 (2d Cir.
1993); McLaughlin v. Anderson, 962 F.2d 187, 191 (2d Cir. 1992); Goldman v. Belden,
754 F.2d 1059, 1069-70 (2d Cir. 1985).
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misrepresentation," 58 suggesting that specification of statements'
content, and the reasons why they were misleading, was the exception
rather than the rule. 59 There was no clear rule then, even in the Second
Circuit, that plaintiffs specify the content of what was said and explain
why it was false or misleading.
Even courts that required plaintiffs to set forth the content of the
statements alleged to be misleading typically did not require plaintiffs to
explain how or why those statements were false. The Seventh Circuit
held that under Rule 9(b), "[a]lthough plaintiffs must specifically identify
allegedly fraudulent statements, they are not required 'to plead facts that
if true would show that the defendant's alleged misrepresentations were
indeed false. ",6° The Second Circuit joined most other courts61 in
holding that, with the exception of allegations of scienter, "a complainant

58. Ouaknine v. Mcfarlane, 897 F.2d 75, 79 (2d Cir. 1990) (sustaining complaint)(citations omitted).
59. Id.; accord, e.g., JUE AFL-CIO Pension Fund v. Herrmann, 9 F.3d 1049, 1057
(2d Cir. 1993) ("This Court has construed Rule 9(b) to require a complaint alleging fraud
to 'allege the time, place, speaker and sometimes even the content of the alleged
misrepresentation."') (quoting Ouaknine, 897 F.2d at 79); Update Traffic Sys. v. Gould,
857 F. Supp. 274, 281 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) ("[I]t is sufficient to allege the 'time, place,
speaker, and sometimes even the content of the alleged misrepresentation"') (quoting
Ouaknine, 897 F.2d at 79).
60. Katz v. Household Int'!, 36 F.3d 670, 675 (7th Cir. 1994) (quoting
Uni*Quality, Inc. v. lnfotronix, Inc., 974 F.2d 918,923 (7th Cir. 1992)). Judge Posner
explained that in the Seventh Circuit:
The reported cases involve misrepresentations, the commonest kind of fraud,
and merely require the plaintiff to state in his complaint 'the identity of the
person making the misrepresentation, the time, place, and content of the
misrepresentation, and the method by which the misrepresentation was
communicated to the plaintiff. . . . They do not require him to plead facts
showing that the representation is indeed false.
Bankers Tr. Co. v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 959 F.2d 677,683 (7th Cir. 1992) (emphasis
added)(citations omitted); see also Midwest Commerce Banking Co. v. Elkhart City
Centre, 4 F.3d 521, 524 (7th Cir. 1993) (in a case alleging fraud, Rule 9(b) does not
require "allegations demonstrating the falsity of any representations or omissions");
Whirlpool Financial Corp. v. GN Holdings, 873 F. Supp. 111, I 18 n.11 (N.D. Ill.) ("Rule
9(b) does not require particularized pleading of ... facts that if true would show that the
defendant's alleged misrepresentations were indeed false.") (emphasis in original), aff'd
67 F.3d 605 (7th Cir. 1995).
61. See, e.g., Shaw v. Digital Equip. Corp., 82 F.3d 1194, 1225 (1st Cir. 1996);
Landry v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'!, 901 F.2d 404,430 n.92 (5th Cir. 1990); Michaels
Bldg. Co. v. Ameritrust Co., N.A., 848 F.2d 674,680 & n.9 (6th Cir. 1988); Seattle-First
Nat'! Bank v. Carlstedt, 800 F.2d 1008, 1011 (10th Cir. 1986).
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is not required to plead evidence"62 to satisfy Rule 9(b)'s particularity
requirement. 63 Section 21D(b)(l) adopts the stronger Ninth Circuit rule
by providing that "the complaint shall specify each statement alleged to
have been misleading, [and] the reason or reasons why the statement is
misleading." 64
GlenFed's requirement that plaintiffs plead facts explaining how and
why a statement is misleading is restated in section 21D(b)(l), moderated by the qualification that "if an allegation regarding the statement or
omission is made on information and belief, the complaint shall state
with particularity all facts on which that belief is formed."65 In many
securities cases, of course, there is no need to plead "on information and
belief."66 Nonetheless, this clause effectively codifies the Ninth
Circuit's holding in Wool v. Tandem Computers, lnc. 67 that fraud may
be alleged on information and belief "if the allegations are accompanied
by a statement of the facts upon which the belief is founded."68 In

62. Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374, 379 (2d Cir. 1974); see
also Ross v. A.H. Robbins Co., 607 F.2d 545, 557 n.20 (2d Cir. 1979). A recent district
court decision summarized the Second Circuit's precedents:
The Court of Appeals has indeed held in some circumstances that "[t]o pass
muster under rule 9(b), the complaint must allege the time, place, speaker,
and sometimes even the content of the alleged misrepresentation." However,
it is equally true that "a complainant is not required to plead evidence."
In re Blech Sec. Litig., 928 F. Supp. 1279, 1290 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (quoting Ouaknine,
897 F.2d at 79, and Schlick, 507 F.2d at 379 (citations omitted).
63. The Second Circuit did require plaintiffs to plead facts constituting
circumstantial evidence of scienter in order to raise a "strong inference" of the required
state of mind, but only if allegations of motive and opportunity were absent. See infra
notes 330-35 and accompanying text.
64. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(l) (1995).
65. Id.
66. Professors Wright and Miller write:
[P]leading on information and belief is not an appropriate form of pleading if
the matter is within the personal knowledge of the pleader or "presumptively"
within his knowledge . . . . Thus, matters of public record or matters generally
known in the community should not be alleged on information and belief
inasmuch as everyone is held to be conversant with them.
5 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§1224, at 206 (2d ed. 1990). In open-market fraud cases, allegations regarding a
publicly-traded issuer's public misrepresentations and omissions often deal with matters
that became generally known to the financial community with a negative public
disclosure that contradicted the issuer's earlier statements. Other allegations may deal
with facts within the knowledge of counsel after careful prefiling investigation, and
therefore need not be made "on information and belief."
67. 818 F.2d 1433 (9th Cir. 1987).
68. Id. at 1439; accord Moore v, Kayport Package Express, Inc., 885 F.2d 531,
540 (9th Cir. 1989). Rule I l(b) expressly permits allegations on the basis ofa "person's
knowledge, information, and belief." FED. R. Clv. P. I l(b). Furthermore, the Supreme
Court has held that a complaint alleging fraud on "information and belief' complies with
Rule 11, Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 383 U.S. 363 ( 1966), and that nothing in any
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Wool, the Ninth Circuit observed that "'[a]llegations of fraud based on
information and belief usually do not satisfy the degree of particularity
required under Rule 9(b),",69 but held that '"an exception exists where,
as in cases of corporate fraud, the plaintiffs cannot be expected to have
personal knowledge of the facts constituting the wrongdoing. "'70 An
allegation of fraud made on information and belief must be accepted if
"[e]ach alleged misstatement is identified by content, date, and the
document or announcement in which it appeared, [along with] the
manner in which such representations were false and misleading."71
Thus, section 21D(b)(l) codifies Ninth Circuit law on pleading
statements, and their falsity, with particularity.

of the Federal Rules can be construed to require dismissal of such a complaint. Id. at
373 (emphasis added); see Hirshfield v. Briskin, 447 F.2d 694, 698 (7th Cir. 1971).
69. Id. at 1439 (emphasis added) (quoting Zatkin v. Primuth, 551 F.Supp. 39, 42
(S.D.Cal. I 982)).
70. Id. In such cases, "the allegations should include the misrepresentations
themselves with particularity and, where possible, the roles of the individual defendants
in the misrepresentations." Kayport, 885 F.2d at 540 (citing Wool v. Tandem Computers
Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1440 (9th Cir. 1987)); see Rolex Employees Retirement Trust v.
Mentor Graphics Corp., 749 F. Supp. I 042, I 047 (D. Or. I 990). Some Second Circuit
decisions recognized a similar rule. See, e.g., Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507
F.2d 374, 379 (2d Cir. 1994).
71. Wool, 818 F.2d at 1440. Wool flatly rejected contentions that allegations made
entirely on "information and belief' were defective in all circumstances: "Applying these
principles to the complaint filed by Wool, we conclude that the particularity requirement
of Rule 9(b) has been met. Although Wool's complaint is based on the SEC's allegations, the paragraphs alleging misleading statements, misrepresentations, and specific acts
of fraud are very precise." Id. at 1439-40. The fact that the complaint relied upon the
SEC's allegations, rather than on counsel's own investigation, apparently was taken to
mean that those allegations were based on "information and belief." Nonetheless, the
complaint satisfied Rule 9(b) because the allegedly misleading statements were
"identified by content, date, and the document or announcement in which [they]
appeared," and the complaint specified "the manner in which such representations were
false and misleading." Id. at 1440; accord. e.g., Flashman v. Singleton, [1990-1991
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ',r95,872, at 93,313 (N.D. Cal. I 991); Wegbreit
v. Marley Orchards Corp., 793 F. Supp. 957, 961-62 (E.D. Wash. 1991); Rolex
Employees Retirement Trust v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 749 F. Supp. 1042, 1047 (D. Or.
1990); In re ZZZZ Best Sec. Litig., [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
',r94,485, at 93,095 (C.D. Cal. 1989); Cincinnati Microwave, Inc. v. Wilson, 705 F. Supp.
1453, 1457 (D. Nev. 1989); Steiner v. Southmark Corp., 734 F. Supp. 269, 273 (N.D.
Tex.), recons. denied, 739 F. Supp. 1087 (N.D. Tex. 1990).
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2.

Section 21D(b)(2) 's Standard for Pleading Scienter

Section 21D(b)(2) provides that a complaint shall "state with
particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant
acted with the required state of mind." 72 The "strong inference"
standard comes from Second Circuit case law, which has long held that
plaintiffs alleging fraud should raise a "strong inference" of scienter-with allegations of motive and opportunity, or by pleading facts that
suggest either reckless or conscious behavior. 73
The Second Circuit began to demand that plaintiffs alleging fraud
plead facts giving rise to a strong inference of scienter in the late
1970s.74 Rule 9(b) states that "[i]n all averments of fraud or mistake,
the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with
particularity."75 But the rule further states that "[m]alice, intent,
knowledge, and other condition of mind of a person may be averred
generally."76 This was long understood to mean that plaintiffs alleging
fraud are not required to plead any facts from which scienter may be
inferred. 77 However, in 1979 the Second Circuit held in Ross v. A.H.
Robins Co. 78 that plaintiffs who allege that defendants knew statements
were false "can be required to supply a factual basis for their conclusory
allegations regarding that knowledge."79 The court considered it
"reasonable to require that the plaintiffs specifically plead those events
which they assert give rise to a strong inference that the defendants had
knowledge of the facts" allegedly making their statements misleading. 80
Since then, the Second Circuit has regularly held that although "'great
specificity [is] not required with respect to . . . allegations of ...
scienter,"' a plaintiff must nonetheless provide some factual basis raising
72. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (1995).
73. See, e.g., Turkish v. Kasenetz, 27 F.3d 23, 28 (2d Cir. 1994); Cohen v. Koenig,
25 F.3d 1168, I I 73-74 (2d Cir. 1994); In re Time Warner, Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259,
268-69 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1397 (1994); JUE AFL-CIO Pension
Fund v. Hermann, 9 F.3d 1049, 1057 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 86 (1994);
Breard v. Sachnoff & Weaver, 941 F.2d 142, 143-44 (2d Cir. 1991); Ouaknine v.
Macfarlane, 897 F.2d 75, 79-82 (2d Cir. 1990); Cosmas v. Hassett, 886 F.2d 8, 12-13
(2d Cir. 1989); Beck v. Manufacturers Hanover Tr. Co., 820 F.2d 46, 50 (2d Cir. 1987);
Ross v. A.H. Robins & Co., 607 F.2d 545, 556 (2d Cir. 1979).
74. Ross, 607 F.2d at 556.
75. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).
76. Id.
77. See, e.g., Walling v. Beverly Enterprises, 476 F.2d 393, 397 (9th Cir. 1973);
Trussell v. United Underwriters, Inc., 228 F. Supp. 757, 774-75 (D. Colo. 1964); Love
v. Commercial Casualty Ins. Co., 26 F. Supp. 481, 481-82 (S,D. Miss. 1939).
78. 607 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1979).
79. Id. at 558.
80. Id. (emphasis added).
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at least a "strong inference" of scienter. 81 Indeed, "conclusory allegations of scienter are sufficient 'if supported by facts giving rise to a
'strong inference' of fraudulent intent. "'82
The required "strong inference" of scienter may be raised through
either of two approaches. 83 "The first approach is to allege facts
establishing a motive to commit fraud and an opportunity to do so." 84
"The second approach is to allege facts constituting circumstantial
evidence of either reckless or conscious behavior."85
Under the "motive and opportunity" test, opportunity is often present.
When a corporation and its management have allegedly perpetrated a
fraud on the market, "no one doubts that the defendants [would have]
had the opportunity, if they wished, to manipulate the price of the
[company's] stock."86 Motive may then be provided by a variety of
factors, such as the company's desire to raise money with an offering of

81. Cohen v. Koenig, 25 F.3d 1168, 1173 (2d Cir. 1994) (citations omitted); see
Turkish v. Kasenetz, 27 F.3d 23, 28 (2d Cir. 1994); In re Time Warner Inc. Sec. Litig.,
9 F.3d 259, 268-69 (2d Cir. 1993); JUE AFL-CIO Pension Fund v. Hermann, 9 F.3d
1049, 1057 (2d Cir. 1993); Breard v. Sachnoff & Weaver, 941 F.2d 142, 143-44 (2d Cir.
I 991); Goldman v. Belden, 754 F.2d I 059, 1070 (2d Cir. 1985). As the Court explained
in Ouaknine v. MacFarlane:
Allegations of scienter are not subjected to the more exacting consideration
applied to the other components of fraud. They are sufficient where, as here,
the allegations lie peculiarly within the opposing parties' knowledge and are
accompanied by information that raises a strong inference of fraud.
897 F.2d 75, 81 (2d Cir. 1990) (citations omitted); accord Breard, 941 F.2d at 143
(quoting Ouaknine, 897 F.2d at 81).
82. IUE, 9 F.3d at 1057 (quoting Ouaknine, 897 F.2d at 80). The determination
must be made "accepting as true the factual allegations in the liberally construed
[c]omplaint, and drawing all inferences in favor of the pleader... " Id. at 1058; see
Cosmas v. Hassett, 886 F.2d 8, 11 (2d Cir. I 989); Yoder v. Orthomolecular Nutrition
Institute, Inc., 751 F.2d 555,562 (2d Cir. 1984); McCoy v. Goldberg, 883 F. Supp. 927,
936 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
83. Time Warner, 9 F.3d at 268-69.
84. Id. at 269; accord In re Wells Fargo Sec. Litig., 12 F.3d 922, 931 (9th Cir.
1993) ("allegations of motive and opportunity in the complaint are sufficient to establish
a basis for inferring ... fraudulent intent"), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 295 (1994). Such
a basis may be shown through allegations of motive to deceive and access to accurate
information. Cohen, 25 F.3d at 1173-74.
85. Time Warner, 9 F.3d at 269; see Breard, 941 F.2d at 144; Beck v.
Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 820 F.2d 46, 50 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
1005 (1988), overruled in part on other grounds; United States v. Indelicato, 865 F.2d
1370 (2d Cir. 1989) (en bane); In re Network Equipment Technologies Inc. Litig., 762
F. Supp. 1359, 1362-63 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
86. Time Warner, 9 F.3d at 269; see also Cohen, 25 F.3d at 1174; RMED Int'! Inc.
v. Sloan's Supermarket, Inc., 878 F. Supp. 16, 19 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
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securities. 87 The opportunity for insiders to sell stock at artificiallyinflated prices similarly provides a motive that raises "a strong
inference" of fraudulent intent. 88 Decisions applying the Second Circuit

87. Time Warner, 9 F.3d at 269-70. In Time Warner, the Second Circuit held that
a rights offering provided a motive to manipulate the price of securities, "thereby
enabling the company to set the rights offering price somewhat higher than would have
been possible without the misleading statements and to lessen the dilutive effect of the
offering." Id. at 269. This motive---the desire to obtain a higher price for a securities
offering--raises a strong inference of scienter under Second Circuit law. Id. at 269-70.
A potential merger or acquisition also provides a recognized motive for securities fraud.
Fleet Nat'/ Bank v. Anchor Medica Television, 831 F. Supp. 16, 40 (D.R.I. 1993)
("Although a motive to profit is not a necessary prerequisite to a finding of scienter and
intent to deceive, the jury was entitled to consider [defendant 'sf incentive to try and
pump up the purchase price as circumstantial evidence of intent to deceive.") ( emphasis
added); In In re Lotus Development Corp. Sec. Litig., 875 F. Supp. 48, 53 (D. Mass.
1995) ("Plaintiffs make well-pied allegations of motive. They allege that all of the
defendants gained heavily from an artificially inflated stock price during the class period:
the insiders through sizable sales of their personal stock holdings; and the company
through an important stock-financed acquisition."); In re PNC Sec. Litig., [1992 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH), 96,865, at 93,523 (W.D. Pa. 1992) (denying denied
a motion to dismiss under Rule 9(b) based upon plaintiff's allegations that "PNC and the
individual defendants allegedly were motivated by a desire to perpetuate PNC's ability
to acquire banks at the lowest possible cost and thus with the minimum dilution to
existing shareholders").
88. See Cosmas v. Hassett, 886 F.2d 8, 12 (2d Cir. I 989). In Cosmas, the Second
Circuit held that allegations that a section I O(b) violation would permit insiders to sell
stock at inflated prices provided a "strong inference that the defendants possessed the
requisite fraudulent intent." Id. at 12-13. The court explained that:
[T]he allegations in the amended complaint herein do establish a motive. The
amended complaint asserts that the defendants owned shares of Inflight (,6)
and that the allegedly fraudulent statements artificially inflated or maintained
the prices of Inflight securities (,38). As we stated in Goldman, 754 F.2d at
I 070: "the . . . implication of the Complaint is that the alleged failure to
qualify the bullish statements was intended to permit individual defendants to
profit from an inflated market price before the truth became known."
Id. at 13 (citing Goldman v. Belden, 754 F.2d 1059, 1070 (2d Cir. 1985)); accord
Cohen, 25 F.3d at 1174; see In re MTC Electronic Technologies Shareholder Litig., 898
F. Supp. 974, 980 n.4 (E.D.N.Y. 1995); Marksman Partners v. Chantal Pharmaceutical
Corp, 927 F. Supp. 1297, 1312-13 (1996).
Such holdings find support in precedents from other circuits, which hold that insider
stock sales raise an inference of scienter- both at the pleading stage and at later stages
when courts hold that insider sales can support a jury verdict of scienter. See, e.g.,
Rubinstein v. Collins, 20 F.3d 160, 169 (5th Cir. 1994) (insider sales of$760,599 raise
an inference of scienter at the pleading stage); In re 3COM Sec. Litig., 761 F. Supp.
1411, 1417-18 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (insider sales of $2 million raise an inference of
scienter). The Ninth Circuit, and other courts, have long held that "[i]nsider trading in
suspicious amounts or at suspicious times is probative of bad faith and sci enter." In re
Apple Computer Sec. Litig., 886 F.2d 1109, 1117 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S.
943 ( I 990); accord Shaw v. Digital Equipment Corp., 82 F.3d 1194, 1224 ( I st Cir.
1996); In re Cryomedical Sciences, Inc. Sec. Litig., 884 F. Supp. 1001, 1020 (D. Md.
1995).
In Deutsch v. Flannery, 823 F.2d 1361 (9th Cir. 1987), the Ninth Circuit held that the
opportunity to sell options raised an inference of scienter under Second Circuit standards.
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standard hold that a professional--.such as an auditor---may have a
reason to intentionally or recklessly ignore facts that make its professional certification of financial statements misleading, because it desires to
maintain a profitable financial relationship or to conceal shortcomings
in its own prior work. 89
The Second Circuit's second approach for alleging scienter allows
plaintiffs to identify circumstances indicating reckless or conscious
behavior. 90 The knowledge or recklessness of an individual may be
inferred from his or her position within a company, or functions in a
particular transaction, and likely access to material information. 91

See Deutsch, 823 F.2d at 1365 & n.3; In re GlenFed, Inc. Sec. Litig., 42 F.3d 1541,
1547 n.6 (9th Cir. 1994) (noting that Deutsch applied Second Circuit law). In Kaplan
v. Rose, the Ninth Circuit held that scienter may be found on the basis of insider stock
sales "'in amounts dramatically out of line with prior trading practices at times
calculated to maximize personal benefit from undisclosed inside information."' Kaplan
v. Rose, 49 F.3d 1363, 1379 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting Apple Computer Sec. Litig., 886
F.2d at 1117).
More recently, in Fecht v. Price Co., the Ninth Circuit held that a corporate offering
of securities and insider stock sales demonstrated knowledge of falsity. 70 F.3d I 078
(9th Cir. 1995). Plaintiffs alleged that the defendant Price Co. and its officers had made
unduly optimistic statements in order to inflate the price of the Company's securities.
Id. at I 084. Two top executives sold stock during the period of the alleged fraud, and
the Company itself raised money with an offering of Real Estate Investment Trust
("REIT") securities. Id. The Ninth Circuit held that "[t]hese sales are circumstantial
evidence that the defendants knew or had reason to know that the financial condition of
the Company was deteriorating well before they disclosed the problems with the
expansion program." Id.
89. District courts in the Second Circuit explain that under such circumstances,
[t]he defendant is motivated not to 'open his eyes' to the underlying facts,
since this would place him in a position of terminating his profitable financial
situation and exposing his associat[ion with], or continuing to participate in the
fraudulent activity, but now without his cherished modicum of deniability.
The combination of this motivation and otherwise unlikely degree of mere
carelessness gives rise to an inference of deliberate disregard for the facts.
In re Leslie Fay Companies, Inc. Sec. Litig., 835 F. Supp. 167, 174 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)
(quoting In re Fischbach Sec. Litig., 1992 WL 8715, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 1992)).
In United States v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1969), the Second Circuit affirmed
accountants• criminal convictions, observing that the jury could have reasonably found
that the accountants were motivated by a desire to "conceal the alleged dereliction of
their predecessors and themselves in former years." Id. at 808; see Elliott J. Weiss, The
New Securities Fraud Pleading Requirement: Speed Bump or Road Block?, 38 ARIZ.
L. REV. 675, 702 & n. I 64 (I 996).
90. See Breard, 941 F.2d at 144; Beck, 820 F.2d at 50; RMED Int'!, Inc. v.
Sloan's Supermarkets, Inc., 878 F. Supp. 16, 19-20 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
91. See, e.g., Breard, 941 F.2d at 144; Cosmas, 886 F.2d at 13; Cohen, 25 F.3d
at 1174; In re MTC Electronic Technologies Shareholders Litig., 898 F. Supp. 974, 979-
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For example, in Cosmas v. Hassett, 92 the complaint alleged that the
Inflight Corporation made optimistic statements about revenues and
projected sales that were false or misleading because the People's
Republic of China ("PRC") had imposed new import restrictions that
corporate directors must have known would adversely affect the
company's sales to that country. 93 The Second Circuit held that the
complaint raised a strong inference of scienter because corporate
directors were in a position to know of the import restrictions and their
likely effect on the company's business. 94
In Cohen v. Koenig, 95 the Second Circuit held that a plaintiff raised
a strong inference of scienter by pleading facts suggesting that defendants likely knew that their financial representations about the Koenig
Group were false. 96 The fact that the defendants "were officers,
directors and majority shareholders of the Koenig Group and were active
managers and ... [thus] fully familiar with all aspects of Koenig
Group's business and financial conditions and operations" was sufficient
to show that the defendants, more likely than not, knew their financial
representations were false-and thus scienter was successfully alleged. 97

80 (E.D.N.Y. 1995); Richland v. Syn-Fuel Assoc., 879 F. Supp. 322, 333 (S.D.N.Y.
1995). Of course, a corporate defendant must be deemed to act with the knowledge of
its employees and agents---including the individual defendants. See Hanon v.
Dataproducts Corp., 976 F.2d 497, 507 (9th Cir. 1992) (corporation "through its
responsible employees, knew about" the problems that made its public statements false
or misleading); see also United States v. Bank of New England, 821 F.2d 844, 856 (I st
Cir.); Franklin Supply Co. v. Tolman, 454 F.2d 1059, 1070 (9th Cir. 1972); United
States v. T.I.M.E. - D.C., Inc., 381 F. Supp. 730, 738 (W.D. Va. 1974).
92. 886 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1989).
93. Id. at 10-12.
94. Cosmas, 886 F.2d at 13. The Court explained:
[T]he amended complaint herein satisfies the sci enter requirement of Rule 9(b).
As already discussed, the amended complaint alleges facts from which one can
reasonably infer that sales to the PRC were to represent a significant part of
Inflight's business. These facts give rise to a strong inference that the
defendants, who the amended complaint alleges were directors oflnflight, had
knowledge of the PRC import restrictions, since the restrictions apparently
eliminated a potentially significant source of income for the company. In light
of the strong inference that the defendants, at the time the allegedly fraudulent
statements were made, had knowledge of the PRC import restrictions, we
conclude that the amended complaint alleges sufficient facts from which it can
be inferred that the defendants had the requisite fraudulent intent.
Id. (emphasis added).
95. 25 F.3d I 168 (2d Cir. 1994).
96. Id. at 1174.
97. Id.; see also In re MTC Electronic Technologies Shareholder Litig., 898 F.
Supp. 974, 979-80 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (directors' positions on audit committee and their
signatures on a prospectus raise a strong inference of scienter regarding massive
accounting fraud).
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A professional's position similarly can raise a strong inference of
scienter with respect to material omissions from documents the
professional participated in drafting. For example, in Breard v. Sachnoff
& Weaver, 98 allegations that a law firm participated in drafting an
offering memorandum that failed to disclose an individual's criminal
conviction raised a strong inference of scienter because omission of this
material information could be considered reckless. 99 The inference of
scienter was strengthened by the fact that the law firm then drafted a
supplemental offering memorandum which disclosed the fact but tried
to minimize it, characterizing it as "immaterial." 100
The many kinds of facts that can be relied upon to survive a summary
judgment motion or to establish scienter at trial also should be capable
of raising "a strong inference" of scienter at the pleading stage. Thus,
accounting violations can help to provide a basis for inferring scienter.101 Violations of specific accounting rules can raise an inference

98. 941 F.2d 142 (2d Cir. 1991).
99. Id. at 144 & n.3. "Indeed, Sachnoff's failure to mention Berg's conviction in
the initial offering memorandum could be considered reckless as a matter of law." Id.
at 144. The Second Circuit reversed a district court's holding that the complaint "failed
to allege any fact from which it could be inferred that '[Sachnoff] had knowledge or
should have had knowledge of the alleged fraud."' Id. at 143. It instead held that
allegations the law firm "participated in drafting" an offering memorandum, but
overlooked material information, did raise a strong inference of recklessness. Id. at I 4445. Compare In re Software Toolworks, Inc. Sec. Litig., 50 F.3d 615, 625-29 (9th Cir.
1994) (holding that scienter may be inferred from professionals' access to undisclosed
material information).
100. Breard, 941 F.2d at 144. The Second Circuit explained:
Moreover, once Sachnoff learned that Berg ... had just been convicted for
mail fraud and conspiracy, Sachnoff should have informed itself of the nature
and extent of Berg's criminal acts, and should have conducted some sort of
independent investigation of the facts supplied by Berg. Failure to do so
before offering the opinion in the supplemental offering memorandum that
Berg's criminal past was 'immaterial' could therefore be considered reckless.
See Goldman v. McMahan, Brafman, Morgan & Co., 706 F. Supp. 256, 259
(S.D.N.Y. 1989) ("An egregious refusal to see the obvious, or to investigate
the doubtful, may in some cases give rise to an inference of ... recklessness.").
Id.
IOI. See Malone v. Microdyne Corp., 26 F.3d 471, 478-79 4th Cir. 1994); United
States v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796, 809-10 (2d Cir. 1969); Marksman Partners v. Chantal
Pharmaceutical Corp., 927 F. Supp. at 1313-15; In re Chambers Dev. Sec. Litig., 848
F. Supp. 619-20 (W.D. Pa. 1994).
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In the Second Circuit, manipulation of accounting rules to report greater
revenues and earnings raises an inference of scienter sufficient not just
to overcome a motion to dismiss, but to defeat summary judgment as
well. w3 In the Ninth Circuit, violation of accounting rules can raise
an inference of scienter strong enough to support a criminal conviction
for securities fraud-beyond a reasonable doubt. 104 Even under
circumstances where evidence of inaccurate accounting figures, or a
misapplication of generally accepted accounting principles, might not by
itself necessarily establish scienter, a showing that a corporate defendant
violated its own policies to recognize revenue is enough to survive a
summary-judgment motion. 105
By using the Second Circuit's "strong inference" formulation, section
21D(b)(2) on its face adopts the Second Circuit standard for pleading
scienter. Had Congress intended to abrogate the Second Circuit precedents creating and interpreting the "strong inference" pleading
standard, it would not have e~licitly adopted the Second Circuit's
"strong inference" formulation. 1 Nothing in section 21D(b)(2)'s text

102. Simpson v. Specialty Retail Concepts, 908 F. Supp. 323,328 (M.D.N.C. 1995)
( evidence of GAAP violations sufficient for an inference of sci enter at the summary
judgment stage); In re MTC Elec. Technologies Shareholders Litig., 898 F. Supp. 974,
980 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (allegations that defendants signed a prospectus containing false
financial statements when defendants were responsible for overseeing company's
accounting sufficiently pleads sci enter at the motion-to-dismiss stage); Ades v. Deloitte
& Touche, 799 F. Supp. 1493, 1499 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (strong inference based on
allegations of facts indicating auditors had become aware of conditions forming basis of
violations of accounting and auditing rules); Duke v. Touche Ross & Co., 765 F. Supp.
69, 75-76 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (strong inference based on allegations accounting firm had
knowledge of underlying facts because of its duty to conduct a review and the extreme
unreasonableness of its assumptions).
103. Wechsler v. Steinberg, 733 F.2d 1054, 1059 (2d Cir. 1984).
104. United States v. Weiner, 578 F.2d 757, 786 (9th Cir. 1978); see also United
States v. Sarno, 73 F.3d 1470, 1494-96 (9th Cir. 1995) (sustaining criminal ftaud
convictions on the basis of GAAP violations).
105. Provenz v. Miller, Nos. 95-15839, 95-16819, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 33085,
at *28-*29 (9th Cir. Dec. 18, 1996). The Ninth Circuit also has held that allegations of
a scheme to inflate financial statements raise an itiference of specific intent to defraud
at the pleading stage. E.g., Blake v. Dierdorff, 856 F.2d 1365, 1370 (9th Cir. 1988); Sun
Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Dierdorff, 825 F.2d 187, 195-96 (9th Cir. 1987). To the extent
these pleading decisions were overruled by GlenFed's en bane holding that no inference
ofscienter is required to be pleaded, 42 F.3d 1541, 1545-47 (9th Cir. 1995), they have
been revived by the new Act's express requirement of a strong inference of scienter.
The same is true of Ninth Circuit district court cases that applied Second Circuit law to
find a strong inference of scienter. See, e.g., Network Equipment Technologies Inc.
Litig., 762 F. Supp. 1359, 1362-63 (1991); 3COM Sec. Litig., 761 F. Supp. at 1417-18;
In re Genentech, Inc. Sec. Litig., [1989-1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
194,960, at 95,372-73 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
106. See Marksman Partners. L.P., 927 F.Supp. 1297, 1310 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
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suggests that it overrules the Second Circuit case law, 107 whose very
language it adopts, on what kind of facts can suffice to raise "a strong
inference" of intentional fraud or recklessness. 108
3.

Section 21D(b)(2) s Preservation of Existing
Standards of Liability

Section 21D(b)(2) requires a plaintiff to "state with particularity facts
giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the
required state of mind," 109 and the "required state of mind" for Section
lO(b) violations has long included recklessness. Section 21D(b)(2)
preserves existing law for the state of mind necessary to establish
liablity---except where Congress has expressly changed the required state
of mind, as for certain forward-looking statements.U 0
The Supreme Court held in 1976 that scienter is an element ofliability
under section lO(b), 111 observing that "[i]n certain areas of the law
recklessness is considered to be a form of intentional conduct." 112
Since then, the circuit courts have uniformly held that the required state
of mind for a section lO(b) action is knowledge of falsity or reckless
disregard. 113
One circuit after another adopted the so-called
"Sundstrand standard" for recklessness, which was first articulated in

I 07. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
108. See infra notes 111-13 and accompanying text; see 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2)
(1995).
109. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (1995)(emphasis added).
110. "Scienter may be satisfied by either proof of actual knowledge or recklessness." Hanon v. Dataproducts Corp., 976 F.2d 497,507 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing Hollinger
v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564, 1568-69 (9th Cir. 1990)).
11 l. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
112. /d.atl94n.12.
113. See, e.g., Rolfv. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 46 (2d Cir. 1978);
Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175, 193 (3d Cir. 1981); McLean v. Alexander,
599 F.2d 1190, I I 97 (3d Cir. I 979); Broad v. Rockwell Int'! Corp., 642 F.2d 929, 96061 (5th Cir 1981) (en bane); Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 1024
(6th Cir. 1979); Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chemical Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1044 (7th Cir.
1977); Alpern v. Utilicorp United, Inc., 84 F.3d 1525, 1534 (8th Cir. 1996); Van Dyke
v. Coburn Enterprises, Inc., 873 F.2d 1094, 1100 (8th Cir. 1989); Stokes v. Lokken, 644
F.2d 779, 783 (8th Cir. 1981); Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564, 1568-69
(9th Cir. 1990) (en bane); Anixter v. Home Products, Inc., 77 F.3d 1215, 1232-33 &
n.20 (10th Cir. 1996); Hackbart v. Holmes, 675 F.2d 1114, 1117-18 (10th Cir. 1982);
Woods v. Barnett Bank, 765 F.2d 1004, 1010 (I Ith Cir. 1985); SEC v. Steadman, 967
F.2d 636, 641-42 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
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Franke v. Mid-Western Oklahoma Development Authority, 114 and
adopted by the Seventh Circuit in Sundstrand Corp. v. SunChemical
Corp ..115 Under the Sundstrand standard:
'[R]eckless conduct may be defined as a highly unreasonable omission,
involving not merely simple, or even inexcusable negligence, but an extreme
departure from the standards of ordinary care, and which presents a danger of
misleading buyers or sellers that is either known to the defendant or is so
obvious that the actor must have been aware of it.' 116

This formulation became a uniform national standard for scienter under
section lO(b), explicitly adopted and applied by the First, 117 Second, 118 Third, 119 Fifth, 120 Sixth, 121 Seventh, 122 Eighth, 123
Ninth, 124 Tenth, 125 Eleventh, 126 and District of Columbia 127 Circuits--as well as by district courts in the Fourth Circuit. 128
Against this background, Congress' choice of "the required state of
mind, " 129 necessarily preserves recklessness as a basis of liability for
most section lO(b) claims. "A fundamental canon of statutory construction is that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking
their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning" in use at the time
Congress enacted the statute. 130 Because the many decisions holding
that recklessness satisfies section lO(b)'s scienter requirement were part
of the "contemporary legal context" presumably known to Congress and
left undisturbed by the text of section 21D(b)(2), they provide "the

114. 428 F. Supp. 719, 725 (W.D. Okla. 1976), vacated, 619 F.2d 856 (10th Cir.
1980).
115. 553 F.2d at I 033, I 044-45 (7th Cir. I 979).
I 16. Id. at 1045 (citation omitted).
117. Hoffman v. Estabrook & Co., 587 F.2d 509,516 (1st Cir. 1978); Cook v.
Avien, Inc., 573 F.2d 685, 692 (1st Cir. 1978).
118. Rolf, 570 F.2d at 47.
,
119. Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175, 193 (3d Cir. 1981); Mclean v.
Alexander, 599 F.2d 1190, I 197-98 (3d Cir. 1979).
120. Broad v. Rockwell Intn'l. Corp., 642 F.2d 929, 960-61 (5th Cir. 1981);
Rubinstein v. Collins, 20 F.3d 160, 169 (5th Cir. 1994).
121. Ohio Drill & Tool Co. v. Johnson, 625 F.2d 738, 741 (6th Cir. 1980).
122. Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chemical Corp., 553 F.2d I 033, 1044-45 (7th Cir.
1977).
123. K&S Partnership v. Continental Bank, N.A., 952 F.2d 971,978 (8th Cir. 1991).
124. Hollinger v. Titan, 914 F.2d 1564, 1569-70 (9th Cir. 1990).
125. Hackbart v. Holmes, 675 F.2d 1114, II 18 (10th Cir. 1982).
126. SEC v. Carriba Air, Inc., 681 F.2d 1318, 1324 (I Ith Cir. 1982).
127. SEC v. Steadman, 967 F.2d 636, 641-42 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
128. PPM America, Inc. v. Marriott Corp., 875 F. Supp. 289, 301-02 (D. Md. 1995);
Frankel v. Wyllie & Thornhill, Inc., 537 F. Supp. 730, 740 (W.D. Va. 1982).
129. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (Supp. 1996).
130. Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 44 (1979).
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required state of mind" for the typical section lO(b) cause of action.m
Had Congress intended to overrule the established law and require actual
knowledge of falsity with section 21D(b)(2), it would have said so. 132
Indeed, when Congress intended, with the PSLRA, to limit liability for
reckless conduct, it did say so. 133 Congress, in enacting a new section
2l(E), chose to provide only a narrow "safe harbor" from recklessness
liability. 134 The "safe harbor" protects specified defendants from
liability for defined "forward-looking statements" unless plaintiff proves
that such a statement was made with "actual knowledge" that the
statement was false or misleading. 135 If a "forward-looking statement"
comes within the "safe harbor," defendants avoid liability if the
statement was "identified as a forward-looking statement, and [was]
accompanied by meaningful cautionary statements identifying important
factors that could cause actual results to differ materially from those in
the forward-looking statement," or if the plaintiff fails to prove that the
statement "was made with actual knowledge" that it was false or

131. See Cottage Savings Ass'n. v. Commissioner, 499 U.S. 554, 561-62 (1991)
(Congress presumably codified decisions that "were part of the 'contemporary legal
context' in which Congress enacted" a statute) (quoting Cannon v. University of
Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 698-99 (1979)); Associated General Contractors v. California
State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519,532 (1983) ("Just as the substantive content
of the Sherman Act draws meaning from its common-law antecedents, so must we
consider the contemporary legal context in which Congress acted when we try to
ascertain the intended scope of the private remedy created by §7."); Herman & MacLean
v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 385-86 (1983) (assuming Congress acted with knowledge
of Section I0(b) precedents when it revised the securities laws in 1975). As the
Supreme Court explained in Lorilland v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580-8 I ( 1978):
Congress is presumed to be aware of administrative or judicial interpretation
of a statute and to adopt tbat interpretation when it re-enacts a statute without
change . . . . So too, where, as here, Congress adopts a new law incorporating
sections of a prior law, Congress normally can be presumed to have had
knowledge of the interpretation given to the incorporated law, at least insofar
as it affects the new statute.
Id. at 580-81 (citations omitted); accord, e.g., Maislin Industries, U.S. Inc. v. Primary
Steel, Inc., 497 U.S. 116, 135 (1990); Norwest Bank Worthington, 485 U.S. 197, 211
(1988); Lindahl v. Office of Personnel Management, 470 U.S. 768, 782 n.15 (1985);
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353,381 n.66 (1982).
132. See Marksman Partners v. Chantal Pharmaceutical Corp., 927 F. Supp. 1297,
1309 & n.9 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
133. See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text.
134. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5 (Supp. 1996).
135. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(l)(B) (Supp. 1996).
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misleading. 136 To establish liability for a statement within the "safe
harbor," plaintiffs must show that the statement, "if made by a natural
person, was made with actual knowledge by that person that the
statement was false or misleading; or... if made by a business entity
... was made or approved by [an] officer with actual knowledge by that

136. The "safe harbor" for qualifying forward-looking statements states, in relevant
part:
.
(c) Safe Harbor. (I) In general. - Except as provided in subsection (b) [which excludes
many statements from the safe harbor], in any private action arising
under this title that is based on an untrue statement of a material fact or
omission of a material fact necessary to make the statement not misleading, a person referred to in subsection (a) [limited to periodically
reporting issuers and their agents} shall not be liable with respect to
any.forward-looking statement, whether written or oral, if and to the
extent that (A) the forward looking statement is (i) identified as a forward-looking statement, and is accompanied by
meaningful cautionary statements identifying important factors that
could cause actual results to differ materially from those in the
forward-looking statement; or
(ii) immaterial; or
(B) the plaintifffails to prove that the forward-looking statement (i) if made by a natural person, was made with actual knowledge by
that person that the statement was false or misleading; or
(ii) if made by a business entity; was (I) made with the approval of an executive officer of that entity; and
(II) made or approved by such officer with actual knowledge by that
officer that the statement was false or misleading.
15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c) (Supp. 1996) (emphasis added).
The disjunctive text of the statute raises a question as to whether persons defined by
subsection (a) are free to lie in a forward-looking statement so long as the statements
"identified as a forward-looking statement, and is accompanied by meaningful cautionary
statements identifying important factors that could cause actual results to differ
materially from those in the forward-looking statement." 15 U.S.C. §78u-5(c)(l)(A)(i)
(Supp. 1996). SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt, Jr. commented that "a person who makes
a deliberate lie with the purpose and intent of defrauding investors cannot provide
'meaningful' warnings to investors under the 'bespeaks caution' prong of the safe
harbor." Letter from Arthur Levitt and Steven M.H. Wallman to Representatives John
D. Dingell and Edward J. Markey, November 27, 1995, at 2 (copy on file with authors).
On this basis, the provision's proponents emphatically denied that it could provide any
"license to lie." See, e.g.. 141 CONG. REC. Sl7934 (Dec. 5, 1995) ("The safe harbor
does not give a license to lie.") (statement of Sen. D'Amato); 141 CONG. REc. Sl7958
(Dec. 5, 1995) ("The idea that this conference report contains any license to lie is simply
and totally untrue .... ") (statement of Sen. Dodd); 141 CONG. REC. S17970 (Dec. 5,
1995) ("The conference report's balanced safe harbor provision encourages companies
to speak by recognizing that predictions are not promises, while prohibiting outright lies
by corporate executives.") (statement of Sen. Domenici); 141 CONG. REC. SI 7911 (Dec.
5, I 995) ("Executives who deliberately lie about their company's prospects would be
liable under the compromise.") (statement of Sen. Reid). The Conference Report
confirms that "boilerplate warnings will not suffice." H.R. CONF. REP. No. I 04-360, at
43 (I 995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 742.
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officer that the statement was false or misleading." 137 Section 21E's
requirement of actual knowledge for certain claims based on forwardlooking statements cannot reasonably be extended to cover all other
claims under section I O(b ). 138
"Expression unius est exclusio
alterius. " 139 Indeed, section 2 lE 's detailed specifications excluding
many persons and statements from the safe harbor would be utterly
frustrated if Section 21D were construed to require proof of actual
knowledge in every case. 140
Moreover, Exchange Act section 2l(g)'s proportionate liability
provision limits the extent of defendants' liability for reckless conduct,
while carefully preserving the rule that reckless conduct can give rise to
liability. 141 The section also provides that it does not affect the basic
scienter standards for establishing a violation of Section 1O(b): "Nothing
in this subsection shall be construed to create, affect, or in any manner
modify, the standard for liability associated with any action arising under
the securities laws." 142 The PSLRA thus expressly preserves the
existing case law holding that recklessness suffices to establish the
scienter element for a section lO(b) violation. Finally, when Congress
restored the SEC authority to prosecute aiders and abettors, it limited
aider-and-abettor liability to "any person that knowingly provides

137. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c){l)(B)(i), (ii), (II) (Supp. 1996) (emphasis added).
138. See Marksman Partners v. Chantal Corp., 927 F. Supp. 1297, 1309 (C.D. Cal.
1996).
139. Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507
U.S. 163, 168 (1993).
140. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(a) (Supp. 1996) (extending protection only to certain
issues of securities and their agents); 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(b) (Supp. I 996) (exclusions of
many statements).
141. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(g) (Supp. 1996). Section 2l(g) provides that any defendant
"against whom a final judgment is entered in a private action shall be liable for damages
jointly and severally only if the trier of fact specifically determines that such covered
person knowingly committed a violation of the securities laws." 15 U.S.C. § 78u4(g)(2)(A). This section recognizes that "final judgment" may be entered without such
a finding, but will result in joint-and-several liability only upon a finding of knowing
conduct, and in less-sweeping "proportionate liability" on a finding of recklessness.
U.S.C. § 78u-4(g)(2) (Supp. 1996). Section 2l(g)(I0) states that "(fjor purposes of this
subsection [a defendant] 'knowingly commits a violation of the securities laws... [only
if it acts] with actual knowledge ... of [falsity]." 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(g)(IO) (Supp.
1996). It specifies that for this subsection alone "reckless conduct by a covered person
shall not be construed to constitute a knowing commission of a violation of the securities
laws by that covered person ...." 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(g)(I0)(B) (Supp. 1996).
142. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(g)(l) (Supp. 1996).
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substantial assistance to another person in violation of this chapter," 143
although the case law had recognized recklessness as a ground for
liability. 144 These specific changes show that Congress did not intend
to raise the basic sci enter standard for all Section IO(b) actions.
Because "forward-looking statements" within the safe harbor now
require proof of actual knowledge of falsity, 145 the "required state of
mind" for some section IO(b) claims based on forward-looking
statements is more than recklessness. But by using "the required state
of mind" in section 21D(b)(2), Congress could require plaintiffs to plead
facts raising a strong inference of knowledge only in cases based
exclusively on forward-looking statements, while allowing plaintiffs to
proceed on the basis of a strong inference of either conscious or reckless
behavior in all other section lO(b) cases.
III.

DOES THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SECTION 2l(D)(b)
CONTRADICT ITS TEXT?

A.

Legislative History and the Silicon Graphics and
Marksman Partners Opinions

Section 21D(b)(2) says that plaintiffs must "state with particularity
facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the
required state of mind." 146 No one doubts that the "strong inference"
language comes from the Second Circuit case law, or that the "required
state of mind" for section JO(b) claims has long included both actual
knowledge of falsity and recklessness. 141
Nothing in section
21D(b)(2)'s statutory text appears to overrule Second Circuit "motive
and opportunity" precedents on how a "strong inference" of scienter may
be pleaded, or to eliminate liability for reckless violations of section
JO(b). On the contrary, the statutory text apparently adopts the Second
Circuit standard for alleging scienter and preserves knowing or reckless
conduct as "the required state of mind" for most section lO(b) actions.
Can legislative history be relied on, as it was in Silicon Graphics, to
contradict this legislative text? And does the legislative history suggest
Congress really intended to overrule precedents accepting allegations of

l 43. l 5 U.S.C. § 78t(f) (Supp. 1996). The Supreme Court had abolished aided and
abettor liability under Section l0(b) with its holding in Central Bank v. First Interstate
Bank, 114 S. Ct. 1439 (1994).
144. See SEC v. Fehn, 97 F.3d 1276, 1288 n.l I (9th Cir. 1996); Levine v.
Diamanthuset, Inc., 950 F.2d 1478, 1483 (9th Cir. 1991).
145. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
146. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (1995) (emphasis added).
147. See supra notes 131-32 and accompanying text.
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motive, opportunity, and recklessness to establish scienter in section
IO(b) cases? Both questions must be answered in the negative.
Legislative history cannot be used to contradict unambiguous statutory
text adopting the Second Circuit's "strong-inference" standard. 148 The
Supreme Court has held that where statutory text "contains a phrase that
is unambiguous--that has a clearly accepted meaning in both legislative
and judicial practic(}-we do not permit it to be expanded or contracted
by the statements of individual legislators or committees during the
course of the enactment process." 149 Thus, a cryptic endnote in the
Statement of the Managers cannot overpower the statutory text itself. 150
Views of the legislation's opponents regarding that endnote's signifi-

148. See Amoco Production Co. v. Village of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 552-53 (1987)
(holding that "[w]hen statutory language is plain, and nothing in the Act's structure or
relationship to other statutes calls into question this plain meaning, that is ordinarily 'the
end of the matter."') (quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984); accord United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises,
489 U.S. 235, 240-41 (1989) ("[A]s long as the statutory scheme is coherent and
consistent, there generally is no need for a court to inquire beyond the plain language
of the statute."); Ex parte Collett, 337 U.S. 55, 61 (1949) (holding that "there is no need
to refer to the legislative history where the statutory language is clear."); Kenaitze Indian
Tribe v. Alaska, 860 F.2d 312, 318 (9th Cir. 1988); Davis v. Michigan Dept. of
Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 808 n.3 (1989) (stating that "[l]egislative history is irrelevant
to the interpretation of an unambiguous statute.") (citation omitted); Heam v. Western
Conference of Teamsters Pension Fund, 68 F.3d 301, 304 (9th Cir. 1995) ("Where the
statute's language 'can be construed in a consistent and workable fashion,' we must put
aside contrary legislative history.") (quoting Valentine v. Mobil Oil Corp., 789 F.2d
1388, 1391 (9th Cir. 1986)).
149. West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 98-99 (1991)
(emphasis added; citation omitted); Hearn, 68 F.3d at 304 ("[L]egislative history-no
matter how clear--can't override statutory text.").
150. United States v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 643,648 (1961) (holding that statements in
the legislative history "have never been regarded as sufficiently compelling to justify
deviation from the plain language of a statute."); see, e.g., Arcadia Ohio v. Ohio Power
Co., 498 U.S. 73, 81 n.2 (I 990) ("[T]he legislative history is overborne by the text.").
Professor Coffee aptly observes:
[I]n Shannon v. United States, the Court confronted a statute whose conference
report specifically "endorsed" a procedure used in one circuit by which the
jury was given specific instructions in connection with the insanity defense.
As clear and specific as this statement was, the Court still gave no weight to
this congressional "endorsement" and instead adopted a very different
procedure, stating "[w]e are not aware of any case ... in which we have given
authoritative weight to a single passage of legislative history that is in no way
anchored in the text of the statute."
Coffee, supra note 28, at 981 (quoting Shannon v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 2419, 2426
(1994)). "From Shannon's perspective then, courts should simply focus on the statutory
text and ignore the surplusage in the legislative history." Id.
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cance--including those stated in the President's veto message--carry
even less weight, for "views of opponents of a bill with respect to its
meaning ... are not persuasive," 151 even with respect to ambiguous
statutory provisions. 152
Nonetheless, in Silicon Graphics Judge Smith relied on President
Clinton's interpretation of the Statement of the Managers accompanying
the Conference Committee Report 153 on the PSLRA to hold that
section 2 lD(b)(2) abrogates Second Circuit precedents allowing plaintiffs
to raise "a strong inference" of scienter with allegations of motive,
opportunity or recklessness. 154 As Silicon Graphics notes, when he
vetoed the PSLRA, President Clinton stated that, although he could
accept the Second Circuit "strong inference" pleading standard called for
by the text of section 21D(b)(2), he feared "the conferees [made] crystal
clear in the Statement of Managers their intent to raise the standard even
beyond that level." 155 That veto was subsequently overridden by
Congress. 156 "Based on this legislative history," Judge Smith in
Silicon Graphics "[found] that Congress did not intend to codify the
Second Circuit standard" for pleading scienter 157 and held that the
PSLRA required proof of "knowing misrepresentation" in all cases. 158

151. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr., 485 U.S. 568, 585
(1988); accord, e.g., NLRB v. Fruit and Vegetable Packers and Warehousemen, Local
760, 377 U.S. 58, 66 (I 964) ("fWJe have often cautioned against the danger, when
interpreting a statute, of reliance upon the views of its legislative opponents.");
Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 394-95 (1951) ("The fears
and doubts of the opposition are no authoritative guide to the construction of
legislation."); see also Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 203-04 n.24 (1976)
(quoting Fruit and Vegetable Packers, 377 U.S. at 66); National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n
v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 680,639 (1967) (quoting Fruit and Vegetable Packers, 377 U.S. at
66); Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 288 & n.22 (1956) (quoting
Schwegmann Bros., 341 U.S. at 394-95); S&H Camp Co. v. NLRB, 160 F.2d 519, 521
(6th Cir. 1947) ("[TJhe views of opponents to the enactment of legislation may not 'be
relied upon as indicative oflegislative intent' ....") (quoting NLRB v. Thompson Prod.,
Inc., 141 F.2d 794, 798 (9th Cir. 1944)).
152. Professor Coffee correctly observes that "the President's characterization of the
[PSLRA] cannot determine what Congress itself intended." Coffee, supra note 28, at
982.
153. The Conference Committee Report or "Conference Report" contains the text
of the statute that emerges from the Conference Committee and that, if enacted, is the
law. The Statement of the Managers is a commentary by the conferees that accompanies
the Conference Committee Report.
154. In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Sec. Lit., No. C96-0393FMS, slip op. at 11-12
(N.D. Cal. Sep 25, 1996).
155. President's Message to House of Representatives Returning Without Approval
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, WKLY. COMP. PRES. Doc. 2210
(Dec. I 9, 1995).
156. 141 CONG. REC. S19146-54, S19180 (daily ed. Dec. 22, 1996).
157. Silicon Graphics, slip op. at 12.
158. Id. at 12-13, 16.
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Judge Smith expressly rejected the contrary holding of Marksman
Partners, 159 in which Judge Rea had carefully reviewed the statutory
text and its legislative history to conclude that section 21D(b)(2) did not
eliminate liability for reckless misconduct. 160 Judge Rea was, moreover, "unimpressed with defendants' enthusiastic reliance on an oblique
reference to 'motive, opportunity and recklessness' in a footnote in the
Conference Committee Report for their argument that the 'motive and
opportunity' test has been jettisoned." 161
In Silicon Graphics, however, Judge Smith placed great emphasis on
the fact that the Conference Committee chose not to include in section
21D(b)(2) language offered by Senator Specter in an amendment which
would have expressly "allowed a plaintiff to use allegations of recklessness or motive and opportunity to establish fraudulent intent," 162 for
"[t]he Conference Committee eliminated this amendment from its version
of the bill." 163 Judge Smith concluded:
Because Congress chose not to include that language from the Second Circuit
standard relating to motive, opportunity, and recklessness, Congress must have
adopted the Conference Committee view . . . . The Court therefore holds that
plaintiff must allege specific facts that constitute circumstantial evidence of
conscious behavior by defendants. 164
Thus, in order to state a private securities claim, plaintiff must now allege
false or misleading statements, describe how the statements are false or
misleading, and create a strong inference of knowing misrepresentation on the
part of the defendants. This standard applies whether the statements in question
are forward-looking or not.'"

Judge Smith wrote that "[t]he Conference Committee's deletion of the
Second Circuit standard from the final bill 'strongly militates against a
judgment that Congress intended a result that it expressly declined to
enact. "'166 Yet the "strong inference" standard in the statute is drawn
from the Second Circuit precedents. 167 The Statement of the Managers

159. 927 F. Supp. at 1308-12; see Silicon Graphics, slip op. at 13 n.4.
160. Marksman Partners v. Chantal Pharmaceutical Corp., 927 F. Supp. 1297, 1309
n.9 (C.D. Cal 1996).
161. ld.at131I.
162. Silicon Graphics, slip op. at 12.
163. Silicon Graphics, slip op. at 12.
164. Id. at 12-13.
165. Id. at 16.
166. Silicon Graphics, slip op. at 13 (quoting Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp. Paving Co.,
419 U.S. 186,200 (1974)).
167. See supra notes 131-32 and accompanying text.
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says that section 2 lD(b)(2)'s pleading standard "is based in part on the
pleading standard of the Second Circuit" regarding allegations of
scienter, but "also is specifically written to conform the language to Rule
9(b)'s notion of pleading with 'particularity. "' 168 "Regarded as the
most stringent pleading standard," the Managers explained, "the Second
Circuit require[ s] that the plaintiff state facts with particularity, and that
these facts, in turn, must give rise to a 'strong inference' of the
defendant's fraudulent intent." 169 However, they added that "[bJecause
the Conference Committee intends to strengthen existing pleading
requirements, it does not intend to codify the Second Circuit's case law
interpreting this pleading standard." 170 An endnote adds that "[t]or this
reason, the Conference Report chose not to include in the pleading
standard certain language relating to motive, opportunity, or recklessness." 171
This does not mean that Congress intended to reject Second Circuit
case law or to repudiate motive and opportunity or recklessness as ways
of establishing scienter for most section 1O(b) actions. The truth is that
Congress could not simply codify Second Circuit case law on motive,
opportunity, and recklessness as a universal pleading standard in section
21D(b)(2) because it also enacted a new Section 21E of the Exchange
Act to provide a narrow "safe harbor" protecting specified persons from
liability for certain forward-looking statements, unless those statements
are made with "actual knowledge of falsity." 172 Since claims within
section 21E's "safe harbor" require "actual knowledge" rather than
recklessness, section 21D(b)(2) could not codify case law allowing a
strong inference of scienter to be raised from allegations of "motive,
opportunity, or recklessness," as recklessness no longer is the governing
standard for some section lO(b) claims. Language in Senator Specter's
proposed amendment of section 21D(b), which said plaintiffs could raise
"a strong inference of scienter" with allegations of motive and opportunity or facts suggesting recklessness, 173 was inconsistent with section
21E's requirement of actual knowledge for forward-looking statements,174 because it would have allowed plaintiffs to proceed on the

168. H.R. REP. No. 104-369, 104th Cong. 41 (1995), reprinted in 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 740.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(l)(B) (1995).
173. See infra notes 289-310 and accompanying text.
174. Congress had explicitly rejected recklessness as the standard of liability for a
Section IO(b) claims based on qualifying forward-looking statements. See supra notes
166-82 and accompanying text.
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basis of recklessness in all situations. 175 Not surprisingly, the Conference Committee deleted it from the bill, inserting language that required
plaintiffs to raise "a strong inference of the required state of mind,"
which may be actual knowledge in some cases, and recklessness in
others. 176
In Silicon Graphics, however, Judge Smith observes that section
21E(c)(l)(B) "provides that defendants are not liable for forward-looking
statements accompanied by cautionary language unless the plaintiff
proves that the statement 'was made with actual knowledge' that it was
false or misleading, "' 177 and extends this narrow, qualified provision
to all section 1O(b) claims. But by extending this rule to all section
JO(b) claims, 178 the Silicon Graphics opinion frustrates Congress'
desire to require actual knowledge only for forward-looking statements.
Silicon Graphics' holding ignores the fact that early drafts of the
legislation expressly required actual knowledge of falsity, and were
rejected because legislators did not want to abolish liability for reckless

175. Thus, in the veto-override debate, Senator Dodd criticized the Specter
amendment because it would have included recklessness as a universal standard of
liability for all section IO(b) claims: "My point simply has been that I do not think the
Specter amendment was--! think it was an effort to get recklessness in, which would
have changed the standard ftom the [S]econd [C]ircuit." 141 CONG. REC. Sl9071 (Dec.
21 1995) (statement of Sen. Dodd). See infra notes 289-310 and accompanying text.
Professor Perino observes that section 21D(b)(2)'s "pleading provision applies to other
private actions under the 1934 Act besides section IO(b)," to argue that "[t]he Specter
Amendment was thus inconsistent with case law holding that recklessness was
insufficient to establish liability under these provisions." Perino, supra note 23, at 404.
We think that section 21 E's requirement of actual knowledge provides for some section
I O(b) claims is far more compelling. Perino cites as support a vacated opinion's holding
that "recklessness may not be used to fulfill section 9's scienter requirement."
Chemetron Corp. v. Business Funds, Inc., 682 F.2d 1149, 1165 (5th Cir. 1982), vacated
460 U.S. 1007 (1983); see Perino, supra note 23, at 404,410 n.61. Perino indicates that
Chemetron was "vacated on other grounds," but Chemetron 's holding that section 9
requires more than recklessness appears to us to conflict with section 9's text and with
precedent holding that reckless conduct satisfies Rule 9(b)'s wilfulness element. See
Dlugash v. SEC, 373 F.2d 107, 109 (2d Cir. 1967); SEC v. Resch-Cassin & Co., 362 F.
Supp. 964, 978 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), and as a vacated opinion it has no precedential value
on the required scienter for liability under section 9. See O'Connor v. United States, 422
U.S. 563, 578 n.2 (1975); Durning v. Citibank, N.A., 950 F.2d 1419, 1424 n.2 (9th Cir.
1991) ("A decision may be reversed on other grounds, but a decision that has been
vacated has no precedential authority whatsoever.") (emphasis in original).
176. See infra at notes 252-59 and accompanying text.
177. Silicon Graphics, slip op. at 16.
178. See supra notes 129-32.
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conduct. 179 Congress decided that it would require actual knowledge
rather than falsity to impose liability for certain narrowly-defined
forward-looking statements, 180 and to impose full joint-and-several
liablity rather than proportionate-fault liablity. 181 Otherwise, it chose
not to change the scienter standard. 182 Congress provided that the
"safe harbor" should apply only to a narrowly-defined group of
"forward-looking" statements. 183 It carefully limited the "safe harbor,"
providing that it would apply only to forward-looking statements of an
issuer subject to reporting requirements under section 13(a) or section
15(d) of the Exchange Act, and to certain persons acting on such an
issuer's behalf, including outside reviewers retained by such an issuer,
or such an issuer's underwriter. 184 Congress provided many exclu-

179. See supra notes 148-6 I and accompanying text.
180. 15 U.S.C. §78u-5 (Supp. 1996).
181. 15 U.S.C. §78u-4(g).
182. See Marksman Partners v. Chantal Corp., 927 F. Supp. 1297, 1309 (C.D. Cal.
1996).
183. Section 21 E(i) defines "forward-looking statements" that may qualify for the
safe harbor requiring proof of actual knowledge:
(i) Definitions--For purposes of this section, the following definitions shall
apply:
(I) Forward-looking statement. - The term forward-looking statement
means(A) a statement containing a projection of revenues, income (including
income loss), earnings (including earnings loss) per share, capital
expenditures, dividends, capital structure or other financial items;
(B) a statement of the plans and objectives of management for future
operations, including plans or objectives relating to the products or
services of the issuer;
(C) a statement of future economic performance, including any such
statement contained in a discussion and analysis of financial condition
by the management or in the results of operations included pursuant
to the rules and regulations of the Commission;
(D) any statement of the assumptions underlying or relating to any
statement described in subparagraph (A), (B), or (C);
(E) any report issued by an outside reviewer retained by an issuer, to the
extent that the report assesses a forward-looking statement made by
the issuer; or
(F) a statement containing a projection or estimate of such other items as
may be specified by rule or regulation of the Commissions.
15 U.S.C. § 78-u5(i)(l) (Supp. 1996).
184. Section 2 IE(a) provides:
(a) Applicability-This section shall apply only to a forward-looking
statement made by (I) an issuer that, at the time that the statement is made, subject to the
reporting requirements of section 78m(a) or section 78o(d) of this title;
(2) a person acting on behalf of such issuer;
(3) an outside reviewer retained by such issuer making a statement on
behalf of such issuer; or
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sions from protection of the "safe harbor," exempting many statements
from section 21E(c)'s actual-knowledge requirement. 185 All of these
provisions are effectively nullified by Silicon Graphics's apparent
holding that a similar actual knowledge requirement applies to all section

(4) an underwriter, with respect to information provided by such issuer or
information derived from information provided by such issuer.
15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(a) (Supp. I 996).
185. Section 21E(b) provides:
(b) Exclusions. - Except to the extent otherwise specifically provided by rule,
regulation, or order of the Commission, this section shall not apply to a
forward-looking statement (I) that is made with respect to the business or operations of the issuer, if
the issuer(A) during the 3-year period preceding the date on which the statement
was first made (i) was convicted of any felony or misdemeanor described in clauses
(i) through (iv) of section 78(b)(4)(B) of this title; or
(ii) has been made the subject of a judicial or administrative decree or
order arising out of a goverrunental action that (I) prohibits future violations of the antifraud provisions of the
securities laws;
(II) requires that the issuer cease and desist from violating the
antifraud provisions of the securities laws; or
(III) determines that the issuer violated the antifraud provisions of
the securities laws;
(B) makes the forward-looking statement in connection with an offering
of securities by a blank check company;
(C) issues penny stock;
(D) makes the forward-looking statement in connection with a going
private transaction; or
(E) makes the forward-looking statement in connection with a going
private transaction; or
(2) that is (A) included in a financial statement prepared in accordance with
generally accepted accounting principles;
(B) contained in a registration statement of, or otherwise issued by, an
investment company;
(C) made in connection with a tender offer;
(D) made in connection with an initial public offering;
(E) made in connection with an offering by, or relating to the operations of, a partnership, limited liability company, or a direct
participation investment program; or
(F) made in a disclosure of beneficial ownership in a report required to
be filed with the Commission pursuant to section 13(d).
15 U.S.C. §78u-5(b) (Supp. 1996).
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lO(b) claims, without regard to whether they come within the section
21E's "safe harbor." 186
Acknowledging that Congress also distinguished between knowing and
non-knowing violations with section 21D(g)(2)'s provision limitingjointand-several liability, Judge Smith brushed it away with the assertion that
"Congress was making the distinction between knowing violators under
section 21D of the [PSLRA] and non-knowing control persons under
section 78t of the original Act, for example." 187 But section 21D says
nothing about "knowing violators;" it speaks only of"the required state
of mind," to be supplied by reference to other sections of the statute and
the case law interpreting them.
In the end, Judge Smith tried to justify her holding on the ground that
"courts should be mindful of ... policy considerations in construing
federal securities law." 188 But the Supreme Court has repeatedly held
that policy considerations cannot override the securities laws' text. 189
No doubt, "Congress sought to 'protect investors, issuers, and all who
are associated with our capital markets from abusive securities litigation. "' 190 But neither the statute nor its legislative history indicates
that assertion of claims based on reckless misstatements or omissions is
"abusive" litigation. Quite to the contrary, when the SEC and others
objected that provisions in early drafts of the legislation would eliminate
liability for reckless misrepresentation, Congress eliminated them. 191
Thus, even if one could argue that some of the policy considerations
underlying the PSLRA might support a higher scienter standard for all
section 1O(b) claims, that would provide no ground for ignoring statutory

186. See In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., No. C96-0393FMS, slip op. at 16
(N.0. Cal. Sep. 25, 1996) ("This standard applies whether the statements in question are
forward-looking or not.").
187. Silicon Graphics, slip op. at 15.
188. Silicon Graphics, slip op. at 15-16.
189. See. e.g., CentralBankv. First Interstate Bank, 114S.Ct. 1439, 1453-54(1994)
("Policy considerations cannot override our interpretation of the text and structure of the
Act, except to the extent that they may help to show that adherence to the text and
structure would lead to a result 'so bizarre' that Congress could not have intended it.")
(quoting Demarest v. Manspeaker, 498 U.S. 184, 191 (1991)); Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S.
622,654 (1988) ("we need not entertain Pinter's policy arguments"); Aaron v. SEC, 446
U.S. 680, 696 (1980) (policy considerations under the securities laws "will not justify
reading a provision 'more broadly than its language and the statutory scheme reasonably
permit"') (quoting Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560,578 (1979) (quoting
SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 116 (1978))); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185,
214 n.33 (1976) (finding "no occasion to examine the additional considerations of
'policy' ... that may have influenced the lawmakers in their formulation of the statute").
190. Silicon Graphics, slip op. at 15 (quoting Statement of the Managers, H. CoNF.
REP. No. 104-369, at 32, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 731).
191. See infra notes 329-35 and accompanying text.

926

(VOL. 33: 893, 1996)

Reform Act of 1995
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

language that clearly embraces existing legal standards. 192 Moreover,
the fundamental stated policy underlying the PSLRA, according to the
Statement of the Managers, was to ensure effective enforcement of
investors' rights, not to frustrate investors' claims by abolishing all
liability based on reckless violations of section lO(b). 193
Far from supporting Silicon Graphics, a careful review of the
legislative history of section 21D(b)(2) actually confirms that Congress
adopted the Second Circuit's "strong inference" pleading standard and
that it intended for courts to seek guidance from Second Circuit
precedents on how a "strong inference" of scienter may be pleaded. The
bill's proponents unquestionably intended to preserve motive, opportunity, and recklessness as means of establishing scienter. 194

192. See United States v. Sisson, 399 U.S. 267, 296-98 (1970). In Sisson, the
Supreme Court interpreted the statutory phrase "decision arresting a judgment" in light
of the contemporary legal context at the time of its enactment, rejecting the dissent's
contention that the "broad policy" under the act mandated a different interpretation:
Radical reinterpretations of the statutory phrase "decision arresting a
judgment" are said to be necessary in order to effectuate a broad policy, found
to be underlying the Criminal Appeals Act, that this Court review important
legal issues. The axiom that courts should endeavor to give statutory language
that meaning that nurtures the policies underlying legislation is one that guides
us when circumstances not plainly covered by the terms of a statute are
subsumed by the underlying policies to which Congress was committed. Care
must be taken, however, to respect the limits up to which Congress was
prepared to enact a particular policy, especially when the boundaries of a
statute are drawn as a compromise resulting from the countervailing pressures
of other policies.
Id.
l 93. According to the Statement of the Managers:
The overriding purpose of our Nation's securities laws is to protect investors
and to maintain confidence in the securities markets, so that our national
savings, capital formation and investment may grow for the benefit of all
Americans.
The private securities litigation system is too important to the integrity of
American capital markets to allow this system to be undermined by those who
seek to line their own pockets by bringing abusive and meritless suits. Private
securities litigation is an indispensable tool with which defrauded investors
can recover their losses without having to rely on government action. Such
private lawsuits promote public and global confidence in our capital markets
and help to deter wrongdoing and to guarantee that corporate officers, auditors,
directors, lawyers and other properly perform their jobs. This legislation seeks
to return the securities litigation system to that high standard.
Statement of the Managers, H. CoNF. REP. No. 104-469, at 31, reprinted in 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N., at 730.
194. See infra notes 295-309 and accompanying text.
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B.
1.

The Legislative History of Section 21D(b)(2)

The Second Circuit "Strong inference" Standard and the
Conflict Among the Circuits

The legislative history of section 21D(b) must begin with the split
among the circuits regarding the Second Circuit's "strong inference"
pleading standard. Describing the Second Circuit's Ross decision as
"contra," the First Circuit in McGinty v. Beranger Volkswagen, Jnc., 195
chose to follow "[t]he clear weight of authority ... that Rule 9[(b)]
requires specification of the time, place, and content of an alleged false
representation, but not the circumstances or evidence from which
fraudulent intent could be inferred." 1% Many courts followed the First
Circuit and McGinty in rejecting Second Circuit law on this point. 197
However, in 1992, with the decision of Greenstone v. Cambex, 198 the
First Circuit departed from the rule it set down in McGinty, without so
much as citing that decision, to state that "[t]he courts have uniformly
held inadequate a complaint's general averment of the defendant's
'knowledge' of material falsity, unless the complaint also sets forth
specific facts that make it reasonable to believe that defendant knew that
a statement was materially false or misleading." 199 The court affirmed
dismissal of a complaint on the ground that "[t]he inferential links are
weak."200
In 1993, a three-judge panel in the Ninth Circuit followed Second
Circuit decisions, holding that "[a]lthough Rule 9(b) allows scienter to
be pleaded generally, courts have required that the facts pied provide a

195. 633 F.2d 226 (1st Cir. 1980).
196. Id. at 228.
197. E.g., Phelps v. Wichita Eagle-Beacon, 886 F.2d 1262, 1270 n.5 (10th Cir.
I989) (rejecting Second Circuit decisions requiring the pleading of "facts that create a
'strong inference"' of scienter because they cannot be reconciled with the "plain
language" of Rule 9(b)); New Hebron Public School Dist. v. U.S. Gypsum, 690 F. Supp.
866, 871 (D. N.D. 1988); Caliber Partners, Ltd. v. Affeld, 583 F. Supp. 1308, 1311
(N.D. Ill. 1984) (rejecting "the solitary viewpoint" of the Second Circuit in Ross, in
favor of "the 'clear weight of authority' as exemplified by McGinty"); SEC v. Tiffany
Industries, Inc., 535 F. Supp. I 160, 1166 (E.D. Mo. 1982) ("Rule 9(b) does not require
any particularity with respect to an averment of intent or knowledge."); Hokama v. E.F.
Hutton & Co., 566 F. Supp. 636, 645 (C.D. Cal. 1983) (rejecting Second Circuit case
law as contrary to the text of Rule 9(b) and noting that "[ o]ther circuits have also
rejected Ross and interpreted Rule 9(b) to mean what it says.").
198. 975 F.2d 22 (1st Cir. 1992).
199. Id. at 25.
200. Id. at 27.
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basis for a strong inference of fraudulent intent."201 "The real inquiry," the court wrote, "must be whether the facts in the amended
complaint would give rise to an inference that the Defendants either did
not believe the statements or knew that the statements were false." 202
The Ninth Circuit granted rehearing and convened en bane, then issued
an opinion vacating the panel opinion and rejecting Second Circuit law
as "irreconcilable with the second sentence of Rule 9(b)."203 To
demand any inference of scienter would "conflict[] both with the English
rule which was the model for Rule 9(b) and with the second sentence of
Rule 9(b) itself, which declares unequivocally that state of mind may be
averred generally, and says absolutely nothing about required inferences."204 Nonetheless, the GlenFed court imposed requirements for
pleading falsity that may be more demanding than some Second Circuit
decisions. 205
GlenFed placed the Ninth Circuit in direct conflict with the Second
Circuit, while decisions in the First, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits appeared
to join the Second Circuit in requiring allegations to raise an inference
of scienter. 206 Decisions from other courts adhered to the rule stated
by the en bane panel in GlenFed. 207
In the summer of 1994, SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt testified before
the Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance of the House of
Representatives Committee on Energy and Finance that "there is a split
in the circuits regarding the application of Rule 9(b) in securities fraud

201. In re GlenFed, Inc. Sec. Litig., 11 F.3d 843, 848 (citing O'Brien v. Nat'l
Property Analysts Partners, 936 F.2d 674, 676 (2d Cir. 1991).
202. Id. at 849.
203. In re GlenFed, Inc. Sec. Litig., 42 F.3d 1541, 1545 (9th Cir. 1994).
204. Id. at 1546. The Ninth Circuit explained:
We are not permitted to add new requirements to Rule 9(b) simply because we
like the effects of doing so. This is a job for Congress, or for the various
legislative, judicial, and advisory bodies involved in the process of amending
the Federal Rules.
Id.

205. See supra notes 82-108 and accompanying text.
206. See Greenstone v. Cambex Corp., 975 F.2d 22, 25 (1st Cir. 1992); Tuchman
v. DSC Communications Corp., 14 F.3d 1061, 1068 (5th Cir. 1994); DiLeo v. Ernst &
Young, 901 F.2d 624,629 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 941 (1990).
207. See, e.g., In re Valuevision International Sec. Litig., 896 F. Supp. 434, 446-47
(E.D. Pa. 1995).
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cases."208 Chairman Levitt observed that "[a]lthough the particularity
requirement of Rule 9(b) does not apply by its terms to allegations
regarding a defendants' state of mind, some courts nevertheless require
that plaintiffs plead with some particularity the facts suggesting that a
defendant had the requisite scienter."209 He testified that "the First,
Fifth, and Seventh Circuits have all started to require a similar
'inference' in cases involving scienter, but that other circuits continue to
apply the more liberal standard."210 Chairman Levitt told Congress
that "[i]t would be beneficial to harmonize the differing standards
applied by the circuit courts of appeal on this issue, either under the
auspices of the Judicial Conference of the United States or through
legislation," after "a careful evaluation of the experience with the Second
Circuit's approach." 211

2.

The Legislative Response

Congress acted to resolve the conflict among the circuits on the
requirements for pleading securities fraud, ultimately adopting the Ninth
Circuit approach to pleading falsity with particularity and the Second
Circuit approach to pleading scienter. Further, after first considering
revisions that might abolish liability for recklessness, Congress decided
to eliminate recklessness liability only for certain forward-looking
statements.

a.

Congressional Hearings and Early Drafts
Culminating in Passage of HR. 1058

In early 1995, the bills proposed to address securities litigation matters
did not incorporate the Second Circuit's "strong inference" standard.
Proposals that would have eliminated liability for reckless misconduct
were considered, but after drawing a hostile response from the SEC,
were quickly abandoned.
As introduced on January 4, 1995,212 Title II of H.R. 10 provided for
changes to the federal securities laws and included new provisions
regarding both the state of mind required to establish liability, and the

208. Securities Litigation Reform: Hearings Before The Subcomm. On Telecommunications And Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 37-38 (1994) (July 22, 1994) (statement of Hon. Arthur Levitt, Chairman, U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission).
209. Id. at 38.
210. Id.
21 I. Id.
212. See 141 CONG. REC. H124 (daily ed. Jan. 4, 1995).
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rules for pleading that state of mind. 213 It would have added a new
section lOA(a) to the Exchange Act, apparently abolishing monetary
liability for reckless misconduct by requiring proof that a "defendant
knew [a] statement was misleading at the time it was made, or intentionally omitted to state a fact knowing that such omission would render
misleading the statements made at the time they were made."214 It

213. H.R. 10, 104th Cong., !st Sess. § 204 (1995), would have added a new section
I 0A which would have provided:
SEC. JOA. REQUIREMENTS FOR SECURITIES FRAUD ACTIONS.
(a) SCIENTER. - In any action under section IO(b), a defendant may be
held liable for money damages only on proof (I) that the defendant made an untrue statement of a material fact, or
omitted to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in light of the circumstances in which they were
made, not misleading; and
(2) that the defendant knew the statement was misleading at the time
it was made, or intentionally omitted to state a fact knowing that
such omission would render misleading the statements made at the
time they were made.
(b) REQUIREMENT FOR EXPLICIT PLEADING AND PROOF OF
SCIENTER. - In any action under section I 0(b) in which it is alleged
that the defendant (I) made an untrue statement of a material fact; or
(2) omitted to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in the light of the circumstances in which they
were made, not misleading; the complaint shall allege specific facts
demonstrating the state of mind of each defendant at the time the
alleged violation occurred. The complaint shall also specify each
statement or omission alleged to have been misleading and the
reasons the statement or omission is misleading. If an allegation
regarding the statement or omission is made on information and
belief, the complaint shall set forth with specificity all information
on which that belief is formed. Failure to comply fully with this
requirement shall result in dismissal of the complaint for failure to
state a cause of action.
Id.
214. Id. By imposing liability only for "an untrue statement of a material fact, or
omi[ ssion] to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in
light of the circumstances in which they were made, not misleading," the new section
I 0A would have effectively eliminated liability for violations of Rule I 0b-5( I) and I 0b5(2), which make it unlawful "to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud," or
"to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate
as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security." 17 C.F.R. § 240. I 0b-5(a), (c). This would have effectively limited liability
under section I 0(b) to violations of Rule !Ob-5(2), which makes it unlawful "to make
any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in
order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they
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also would have added a new Section IOA(b), requiring a section IO(b)
complaint to "allege specific facts demonstrating the state of mind of
each defendant at the time the alleged violation occurred."215 The bill
was referred to the House Committee on Commerce, and the Committee
on the Judiciary. 216 The Commerce Committee's Subcommittee on
Telecommunications and Finance then held hearings in January and
February of 1995. 217
As introduced by Senator Domenici on January 18, 1995,218 S. 240
would have added a new section 39 to the Exchange Act, providing:
In an implied action arising under this title in which the plaintiff may recover
money damages from a defendant only on proof that the defendant acted with
some level of intent, the plaintiff's complaint shall allege specific facts
demonstrating the state of mind of each defendant at the time the alleged
violation occurred. 219

were made, not misleading." 17 C.F.R. § 10b-5(b). Ultimately, Congress chose not to
enact language overruling the many decisions that have recognized liability under section
I O(b) for a "device, scheme, or artifice to defraud," or for conduct that "operates as a
fraud or deceit." E.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 (1976) (noting
that section IO(b)'s phrase prohibiting "any manipulative device or contrivance" by
definition includes schemes to defraud) (quoting WEBSTER'S INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY ( 1934)); Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 150, 152-53
(1972) (noting that although "the second subparagraph of the rule specifies the making
of an untrue statement of a material fact and the omission to state a material fact,"
nonetheless "[t]he first and third subparagraphs are not so restricted ... " and impose
liability for defendants' conduct which fall "within the very language of one or the other
of those subparagraphs, a 'course of business' or a 'device, scheme, or artifice' that
operated as a fraud"); Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891,903 n.19 (9th Cir. 1975) ("Rule
I Ob-5 liability is not restricted solely to isolated misrepresentations or omissions; it may
also be predicated on a 'practice, or course of business which operates ... as a fraud
... '"), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 891 (I 976); Competitive Associates, Inc. v. Laventhol,
Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 516 F.2d 811,814 (2d Cir. 1975) ("Not every violation
of the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities law can be, or should be, forced into
a category headed 'misrepresentations' or 'nondisclosures.'
Fraudulent devices,
practices, schemes, artifices and courses of business are also interdicted by the securities
laws."); In re ZZZZ Best Sec. Litig., 864 F. Supp. 960, 967-72 (C.D. Cal. 1994)
(reviewing principles and precedents dealing with "scheme to defraud" liability); In re
Union Carbide Corp. Consumer Products Business Sec. Litig., 676 F. Supp. 458, 467-69
(S.D.N.Y. I 987).
215. H.R. 10, 104th Cong., 2nd Sess. § 204 (1995).
2 I 6. 141 CONG. REC. HI 24 (daily ed. Jan. 4, I 995).
217. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Finance of the
House Comm. on Commerce, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
218. 141 CONG. REC. S1070, Sl075-84 (daily ed. Jan. 18, 1995).
219. S. 240, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. § 104 (1995) (emphasis added). The new
section 39 would have provided:
SEC. 39. REQUIREMENTS FOR SECURITIES FRAUD ACTIONS
(a) INTENT. - In an implied private action arising under this title in
which the plaintiff may recover money damages from a defendant only
on proof that the defendant acted with some level of intent, the
plaintiffs complaint shall allege specific facts demonstrating the state
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It also would have required plaintiffs asserting claims under Rule lOb5(2) to "specify each statement alleged to have been misleading, the
reason or reasons why the statement is misleading, and, if an allegation
regarding the statement or omission is made on information and belief,
the plaintiff shall set forth all information on which that belief is
formed." 220 S. 240 was referred to the Senate Committee on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs. 221 Its Subcommittee on Securities held
hearings on the bill in March and April of 1995.222
SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt condemned H.R. 10 in his February 10,
1995 testimony before the Subcommittee on Telecommunications and
Finance of the House Committee on Commerce. 223 He warned that
our capital markets "could be seriously harmed by overzealous
legislation," because "private rights of action are fundamental to the
success of those markets."224 Among the SEC's objections to H.R. 10
was the issue of sci enter. 225
The SEC was "against any proposal to require a plaintiff to prove that
the defendant had actual knowledge" that statements were false. 226
Liability for reckless misconduct was "needed to protect the integrity of

of mind of each defendant at the time the alleged violation occurred.
(b) MISLEADING STATEMENTS AND OMISSIONS. - In an implied
action arising under this title in which the plaintiff alleges that the
defendant( 1) made an untrue statement of a material fact; or
(2) omitted to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in the light of the circumstances in which they
were made, not misleading; the plaintiff shall specify each
statement alleged to have been misleading, the reason or reasons
why the statement is misleading, and, if an allegation regarding the
statement or omission is made on information and belief, the
plaintiff shall set forth all information on which that belief is
formed.
Id.

220. Id.
221. 141 CONG. REC. SI070 (daily ed. Jan. 18, 1995).
222. Securities Litigation Reform Proposals S. 240, S. 667, and H.R. 1058:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing,
and Urban Affairs, 104th Cong., I st Sess. ( 1995).
223. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Finance of the
House Comm. on Commerce, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 191-221 (1995).
224. Id. at I 93.
225. Id. at 194.
226. Id.
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the disclosure process which . . . represents the integrity of the
markets."227 Chairman Levitt explained: 228
We really want corporations----we want executives of corporations------to worry
about the accuracy of their disclosures. It is the best way I know to assure the
markets of a continuous stream of reliable, accurate information. Any higher
scienter standard threatens the process that has made our markets what they are.
Indeed, an actual knowledge standard could create a legal incentive to ignore
indications of fraud. The phrase, "Ignorance is bliss," could take on, unhappily,
new meaning.

Chairman Levitt's prepared remarks underscored the SEC's objections
to eliminating liability for reckless misconduct. 229 By "requiring proof
that the defendant acted knowingly and intentionally," H.R. 10 signalled
"a retreat from the recklessness standard [that] would greatly erode the
deterrent effect of private actions."23 Chairman Levitt explained:

°

The Commission has consistently supported a recklessness standard because
such a standard is needed to protect the integrity of the disclosure process. The
law should sanction corporations and individuals who act recklessly when
making disclosures, because that is the only way to assure the markets of a
continuous stream of accurate information. Any higher scienter standard would
lessen the incentives for corporations and other issuers to conduct a full inquiry
into areas of potential exposure, and thus threaten the process that has made our
markets a model for nations around the world.
Moreover, because an actual knowledge standard would virtually foreclose
recovery against attorneys, accountants, and financial advisers, it would reduce
the degree to which such professional advisers encourage full and complete
disclosure.'3 1

Chairman Levitt's prepared remarks also indicated that "[t]he
Commission believes that it would be beneficial to resolve the split

between the circuits regarding the proper application of Rule (9b)." 232
Chairman Levitt noted that the Second Circuit "has long required that
plaintiffs pleading securities fraud alleged facts giving rise to a 'strong
inference' of fraudulent intent on the part of the defendants,"233 and
other courts had recently "started to require a similar 'inference of
scienter.'"234 But H.R. 10 demanded too much. It would "require

227. Id.
228. Id. at 194-95.
229. Id. at 201-02.
230. Id. at 202.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 199 (emphasis added).
233. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Ross v. A.H. Robbins Co., 607 F.2d 545, 558 (2d
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 946 (1980)).
234. Id. (citing Greenstone v. Cambex Corp., 975 F.2d 22, 25 (1st Cir. 1992);
Tuchman v. DSC Communications Corp., 14 F.3d 1061, 1068 (5th Cir. 1994); Di Leo
v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 629 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 941 (1990).
Chairman Levitt noted that other courts of appeal had rejected this approach on the
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plaintiffs to plead specific facts 'demonstrating' the state of mind of each
defendant-a test which arguably is more severe than that employed in
any of the circuits today."235 Chairman Levitt noted that many
plaintiffs would not be able to demonstrate a defendant's state of mind
without having the chance to conduct discovery. 236
On February 14, 1995, after hearings on H.R. 10, the Subcommittee
on Telecommunications and Finance approved an amendment to Title II
of H.R. IO in the form of a substitute, and it then ordered the bill as
amended reported to the full Committee. 237 The substitute's provision
took a step toward restoring liability for reckless misconduct. 238 Its

ground that it goes beyond the language of Rule 9(b). Id. (citing In re GlenFed, Inc.
Sec. Litig., 42 F.3d 1541 (9th Cir. 1994) (en bane); Phelps v. Wichita Eagle-Beacon, 886
F.2d 1262, 1270 n.5 (10th Cir. 1989); Auslender v. Energy Management Corp., 832 F.2d
354, 356 (6th Cir. 1987)).
235. Id.
236. Id. Specifically, Mr. Levitt stated: "It is likely that there would be many cases
in which plaintiffs with meritorious claims would be unable to make such a demonstration without an opportunity to conduct discovery." Id.
237. 141 CONG. REC. D191 (daily ed. Feb. 14, 1995) (daily digest).
238. It did so with a convoluted and confusing text that appeared to require
plaintiffs to prove that fraud was both intentional and reckless. H.R. 10, Committee
Print Showing the Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute to Title II of H.R. 10
Adopted By the Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance. (Feb. 14, 1995).
The new Section 204 of H.R. 10 called for adding a new Section 10A(a) to the
Exchange Act, providing:
(a) SCIENTER. (1) IN GENERAL. - In any private action arising under this title based on
a misstatement or omission of a material fact, liability may not be
established unless the defendant possessed the intent to deceive,
manipulate, or defraud. The defendant may be found to have acted with
such intent only on proof that (A) the defendant directly or indirectly made a fraudulent statement;
(B) the defendant possessed the intention to deceive, manipulate, or
defraud; and
(C) the defendant made such fraudulent statement knowingly or

recklessly.
(2) FRAUDULENT STATEMENT. - For purposes of paragraph (I), a
fraudulent statement is a statement that contains an untrue statement of
a material fact, or omits a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in the light of the circumstances in which they were
made, not misleading.
(3) KNOWINGLY. -For purposes of paragraph(]), a defendant makes
a fraudulent statement knowingly if the defendant knew that the
statement of a material fact was misleading at the time it was made, or
knew that an omitted fact was necessary in order to make the statements
made, in the light of the circumstances in which they were made, not
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prov1s10n on pleading scienter required plaintiffs to "make specific
allegations which, if true, would be sufficient to establish scienter as to
each defendant at the time the alleged violation occurred."239
The SEC responded swiftly with a press release on February 15, 1995,
expressing concern regarding the amended bill's provisions--including
the "pleading requirements, [and] the standard to establish reckless
conduct"---concluding that "[b]ecause of the potential impact on U.S.
investors and markets, the Commission cannot support the proposed
provisions." 24° Chairman Levitt sent a letter to Representative Bliley
explaining that the SEC opposed the amended bill's provisions, including
those on "the standard to establish recklessness, [and] the pleading
requirements," because "these provisions would adversely affect the
interests of U.S. investors."241 Chairman Levitt assured Representative
Bliley that the SEC supported his "effort to craft balanced legislation,"
but warned that "the proposed language approved yesterday does not
achieve the balance we would seek."242
The next day, the subcommittee agreed to an amendment submitted
by Representative Cox, which further refined the statutory definition of

misleading.
(4) RECKLESSNESS. -For purposes of paragraph(!), a defendant makes
a fraudulent statement recklessly if the defendant, in making such
statement, acted with willful blindness such that the defendant was
consciously aware of a high probability that the statement was false, and
took deliberate actions in order to avoid ascertaining its truth or falsity.
A defendant who actually believed the statement was true is not
reckless.
H.R. JO, Committee Print§ 204 (Feb. 14, 1995) (emphasis added).
239. H.R. 10., Committee Print §204 (Feb. 14, 1995) (emphasis added). The
substitute' s provision on pleading scienter provided for a new Securities Exchange Act
section IOA(b ):
(b) REQUIREMENT FOR EXPLICIT PLEADING AND PROOF OF
SCIENTER. - In any private action to which subsection (a) applies, the
complaint shall specify each statement or omission alleged to have hen
misleading, and the reasons the statement or omission is misleading. The
complaint shall also make specific allegations which, if true, would be
sufficient to establish scienter as to each defendant at the time the alleged
violation occurred. It shall not be sufficient for this purpose to plead the
mere presence of facts inconsistent with a statement or omission alleged
to have been misleading. If an allegation is made on information and
belief, the complaint shall set forth with specificity all information on
which that belief is formed.
H.R. JO, Committee Print §204 (Feb. 14, 1995).
240. Statement by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Regarding H.R.
JO as Amended On February 14, Securities and Exchange Commission News Release
(Feb. 15, 1995).
241. Letter from SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt, Jr., to Rep. Thomas Bliley,
Chairman, Committee on Commerce (Feb. 15, 1995) (on file with authors).
242. Id.

936

[VOL. 33: 893, 1996]

Reform Act of 1995
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

recklessness. 243 This definition paralleled the Sundstrand standard
adopted by the federal courts and endorsed by the SEC. 244 The SEC
responded, stating that "the current version of R.R. l O represents an
improvement over the bill as originally introduced," in part because it
now expressly "preserved liability based on reckless conduct."245 Still,
the SEC objected that the text might inadvertently extend scienter
requirements to section 14 and section 18 claims, which required no
showing of scienter,246 and it recommended revising the definition of
recklessness to more closely conform to the Sundstrand formulation. 247

243. Representative Cox's amendment revised subsection (4) to read:
(4) RECKLESSNESS. - For purposes of paragraph (1), a defendant makes
a fraudulent statement recklessly if the defendant, in making such
statement, is guilty of highly unreasonable conduct that (A) involves not
merely simple or even gross negligence, but an extreme departure from
standards of ordinary care, and (B) presents a danger of misleading buyers
or sellers that was either known to the defendant or so obvious that the
defendant must have been consciously aware of it. For example, a
defendant who genuinely forgot to disclose, or to whom disclosure did not
come to mind, is not reckless.
Amendment to the Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute (Feb. 16, 1995) (copy on
file with the authors). This provision deviated from the Sundstrand standard itself in two
respects. First, the word "consciously" does not appear in Sundstrand. Second, the final
sentence, giving an example of conduct that would not be reckless, is completely new.
244. See supra notes 115-16 and accompanying text.
245. H.R. REP. No. 104-50, 104th Cong. (1995), reprinted in 120 C.I.S. H273-2,
42.
246. Id. at 43. The SEC objected that the text "would have the effect of requiring
a showing of scienter in proxy cases brought under Section 14 of the Exchange Act and
disclosure cases brought under Section 18, neither of which currently has a scienter
requirement, in addition to cases under Section I0(b)." Id.
247. Id. at 43-44. The SEC explained:
Subsection I0A(a) would provide that liability in a private action may be
based on conduct that satisfies a definition of recklessness based generally on
the standard enunciated by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in
Sun[d]strand Corporation v. Sun Chemical Corporation.
The Sun[d]strand definition has been altered by adding the word "consciously" near the end of the first sentence, and by adding the second sentence,
which paraphrases a footnote in the Sun[d}strand opinion. The extent to
which these amendments would change the result in any particular case is
unclear, but the Commission believes that it would be preferable simply to
codify the Sun[d]strand definition as currently applied by a majority of the
federal circuit courts.
Id. The SEC also recommended "that the second part of the three part test in Subsection
I 0A(a) be deleted as redundant, as a defendant's intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud
is established by evidence that the defendant knowingly or recklessly made a fraudulent
statement." Id.
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The SEC also objected to the provision on pleading scienter:
For purposes of pleading scienter, subsection (b) of new Section IOA would
require a plaintiff to make specific allegations which, if true, would be
sufficient to "establish" that the defendant acted knowingly or recklessly. It
then adds that "it shall not be sufficient for this purpose to plead the mere
presence of facts inconsistent with a statement or omission alleged to have been
misleading."
As the Commission noted in its testimony, it would be beneficial to resolve
the existing split between the circuit courts regarding pleading requirements
under Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In the Commission's
view, however, the standard in H.R. IO would place unrealistic demands on
plaintiffs. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals currently requires that plaintiffs
plead with some particularity facts giving rise to a "strong inference" of
fraudulent intent on the part of the defendant. This test is regarded as being the
most stringent used today, and the Commission recommends that Congress not
enact anv pleading requirements that go beyond those used by the Second
Circuit. 2411

The SEC's objections and suggestions were included in the Commerce
Committee's report on the bill. 249 The committee report explained that
its restatement of the Sundstrand standard, "particularly as it has been
applied in the case law of the Second and Seventh Circuits, will provide
the degree of consistency and certainty,"250 but that "[i]n adopting a
standard that includes language from the Sundstrand case . . . the
Committee notes that it in no way intends to codify all of the prior case
/aw-indeed, any particular case-purporting to apply that decision."251 As to pleading scienter, the Committee explained that the bill
would require a plaintiff to "specify each statement or omission alleged
to have been misleading and must make specific allegations which, if
true, would be sufficient to establish that the defendant acted knowingly
or recklessly. " 252
The text of Title II of H.R. 10, as amended and reported by the
Commerce Committee, was introduced by Representative Bliley on
February 27, 1995, as a new bill, H.R. 1058.253 The bill was considered and amended by the House on March 7 and 8, 1995, conforming
its language on recklessness more precisely to the Sundstrand stan-

248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
(I 995).
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Id. at 44.
H.R. REP. No. 104-50, 104th Cong., 42-46 (1995).
Id. at 39.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).
141 CONG. REc. H2306 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 1995); H.R. I058, I 04th Cong.
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dard. 254 The House of Representatives clearly intended to preserve
recklessness as a basis of liability.
It did not intend to require proof of scienter in a complaint. On the
floor of the House, Representative Cox defended H.R. 1058's requirement that a complaint must "make specific allegations which, if true,
would be sufficient to establish scienter as to each defendant at the time
the alleged violation occurred. "255 He declared that this phrase was
not intended to require proof of scienter in the complaint:
First of all, we are talking today about allegations, so we do not need to know
that they are true. You simply allege it and you get on with your lawsuit, you
go through discovery, you take depositions, you subpoena records, and so on,
and see if you can back up those allegations. But you make the allegations in
your complaint; you do not put the proof in your complaint.
Second, you can do it on information and belief, so you just state in your
pleading that the plaintiff is informed and believes and thereupon alleges
that--and that is very, very easy to do. The complaint shall make allegations
which, if true, would be sufficient to establish Scienter.
So for purposes of judging the pleading, all the court does is assume all of
the allegations are true even before you have actually proved them, and if added
together, assuming their truthfulness, they would state a cause of action and you
get by judgment on the pleadings, and awa1, you go and you are off with your
lawsuit. That is the way it ought to work. "

Representative Cox defended his bill's language against a proposed
amendment offered by Representative Bryant, explaining that:
254. 141 CONG. REC. H2749-H2780 (daily ed. March 7, 1995), 141 CONG. REC.
H2818-H2864 (daily ed. March 8, 1995). Representative Fields offered an amendment
of technical and conforming changes that, among other things, struck the word
"consciously" from the definition of recklessness. Id. at H2779. Representative Fields's
amendment also narrowed the scope of the scienter requirement, so that it would apply
only to actions under section I O(b), and not to actions under section 14 or Section I 8.
Id. The amendment was agreed to without dissent on March 7. Id.
On March 8, Representative Eshoo offered an amendment that would strike the
following words: "For example, a defendant who genuinely forgot to disclose or to
whom disclosure did not come to mind is not reckless." 141 CONG. REC. H28!8 (daily
ed. March 8, 1995). Representative Eshoo explained that Congress should delete the
"sentence which allows the defendant to escape liability" for reckless fraud, by saying
"I forgot to tell the truth." Id. Representative Cox agreed that the objectionable sentence
might be removed, but his substitute inserted the following language in its place:
"Deliberately refraining from taking steps to discover whether one's statements are false
or misleading constitutes recklessness, but if the failure to investigate was not deliberate,
such conduct shall not be considered to be recklessness." Id. at H2820. The amendment
offered by Representative Cox as a substitute for the amendment offered by Representative Eshoo was agreed to by a roll call vote. Id. at H2826.
255. H.R. 1058 § 4, 104th Cong. (1995).
256. 141 CONG. REC. H2836 (daily ed. March 8, 1995) (statement of Rep. Cox).
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[W]e are not asking anyone do anything other than allege. We are asking
people to make an allegation. That is[,] they can charge something. They do
not have to prove it until later."'

And he contrasted the House bill with what he believed to be the more
demanding alternative text of S. 240, which would require plaintiffs to
"allege specific facts demonstrating the state of mind of each defendant,"258 explaining that the House bill required less than this. With
these assurances from the bill's leading proponent, H.R. 1058 passed the
House on a vote of 325 to 99. 259

b.

The Pleading Standard in Senate Hearings

The House bill was received by the Senate and referred to the Senate
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs. 260 Its Subcommittee on Securities held hearings on H.R. 1058 and on S. 240 in March
and April of 1995. 261
On April 6, 1995, SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt, Jr. testified before
the subcommittee, 262 calling S. 240 "a positive step," but urging
Congress to revise the legislation's provisions relating to state of
mind. 263 He again asked Congress "to work together to make certain

141 CONG. REC. H2850 (daily ed. March 8, 1995) (statement of Rep. Cox).
Id. The Dodd-Domenici proposal is as follows:
The complaint shall allege specific facts demonstrating the state of mind of
each defendant.
Rep. Cox explained that:
[W]e had a lot of complaints about that language on our side because
people said, "Well, you would have to be a mind reader in order to
demonstrate the state of mind of each defendant." So now our bill no
longer says that. It says that the complaint shall specify each statement
or omission alleged to have been misleading. Those are objective facts
and the reasons that the statement or omission was misleading. That is
factual as well, and of course one only has to allege it.
The complaint shall also make specific allegations which, if true, would
be sufficient to establish scienter. So one only has to allege things which,
if true, if they were proved later, would add up to a case that meets all the
requirements of the existing law.
141 CONG. REC. H2850 (daily ed. March 8, 1995).
259. 141 CONG. REC. H2863-64 (daily ed. March 8, 1995).
260. Securities Litigation Reform Proposals S. 240, S. 667 and H.R. 1058: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs, 104th Cong. 104-57 (1995) [hereinafter Securities Litigation Reform
Proposals].
261. Id. The subcommittee held hearings on March 2, March 22, and April 6, 1995.
Id.
262. Id. at 228-36, 247-57 (opening and prepared statements of Arthur Levitt and
colloquy).
263. Id. at 230.
257.
258.
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improvements in the bill, including the adoption of the Second Circuit's
pleading requirement that plaintiffs plead with particularity ... facts that
give rise to a strong inference of fraudulent intent by the defendant."264
When asked about his primary concerns with the proposed legislation,
Chairman Levitt reiterated that "the standards for pleading a defendant's
state of mind should be conformed to the Second Circuit standard .
265
"
He urged the senators to use the Sundstrand standard of
recklessness, to "avoid the kind of confusion that would result from the
present wording."266 "Those two areas," he testified, "are probably the
most important. " 267
Chairman Levitt's prepared remarks similarly urged the adoption of
the Second Circuit's pleading requirement, that plaintiffs plead with
particularity facts ~iving rise to a "strong inference" of fraudulent intent
by the defendant. 2 8 Chairman Levitt explained:
[T]here is a split between the circuit courts regarding the manner in which Rule
9(b) should be interpreted. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals requires that
a plaintiff pleading securities fraud allege facts that give rise to a "strong
inference" of fraudulent intent on the part of the defendant. 269 This requirement may be satisfied either by alleging facts that establish a motive to commit
fraud and an opportunity to do so, or by alleging facts that constitute
circumstantial evidence of either reckless or conscious behavior270• • • • Other
courts of appeal, however, including most recently the Ninth Circuit, have
rejected this approach on the grounds that it goes beyond the plain language of
Rule 9(b). 271

He further observed:
The pleading provision in the House bill would require a plaintiff "to make
specific allegations which, if true, would be sufficient to establish scienter as

264. Id.; see also id. at 235-36 ("I think this notion of state of mind is so vague and
open to so many different interpretations, that I really believe that we should conform
to the Second Circuit standard that plaintiffs plead with particularity facts that give rise
to a strong inference of fraudulent intent. And I think by codifying that, we accomplish
pretty much what we intend to accomplish with respect to pleadings.").
265. Id. at 231.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 24 7.
269. Ross v. A.H. Robins Co., 607 F.2d 545, 558 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446
U.S. 946 (1980); In re Time Warner Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d at 268.
270. In re Time Warner Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d at 268-69.
271. In re GlenFed Inc. Sec. Litig., 42 F.3d, 1541, 1547 (9th Cir. 1994); Phelps v.
Wichita Eagle-Beacon, 886 F.2d 1262, 1270 n.5 (10th Cir. 1989); Auslender v. Energy
Management Corp., 832 F.2d 354, 356 (6th Cir. 1987).
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to each defendant." Unless facts giving rise to "a strong inference" of scienter
are viewed as sufficient to "establish" scienter, this test is more stringent than
even the standards currently imposed by the Second Circuit. The pleading
requirement proposed in the Domenici-Dodd bill would require a plaintiff to
"allege specific facts demonstrating the state of mind of each defendant." This
test may be less onerous than that provided in the House bill, but the use of the
word "demonstrating" may still create a standard more stringent than the
Second Circuit standard. 272

Chairman Levitt then recommended "that the language be amended to
conform with the language actually used by the Second Circuit, which
has been clarified and refined by the case law and is therefore less likely
to generate additional litigation."273
Chairman Levitt warned that "it is unrealistic to expect a plaintiff, at
the commencement of an action, to be able to present facts specifically
demonstrating that a defendant acted with the requisite state of
mind."274 "Indeed, in most cases it may be impossible at the pleading
stage, before any discovery has been taken, to meet such a burden."275
Chairman Levitt was concerned with any provision that:
"(I]t shall not be sufficient ... to plead the mere presence of facts inconsistent
with a statement or omission alleged to have been misleading." The contemporaneous existence of facts inconsistent with a defendant's statement is the type
of evidence often relied upon by a plaintiff to establish an inference of scienter.
Indeed, it may be the only evidence available to a plaintiff prior to discovery.'"

To resolve the split between the circuits regarding the proper
application of Rule 9(b), the Commission recommended that Congress
obtain input from the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules of the Judicial
Conference of the United States prior to enacting any legislation. 277
The Commission further recommended "that Congress not enact any
pleading requirements that go beyond those used by the Second Circuit,
which are regarded as being the most stringent used today."278

c.

The "Strong Inference" Provision Enters S. 240's Text

The Second Circuit's "strong inference" standard was added by the
Senate Banking Committee in order to bring the nation's other courts

272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
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into line with the Second Circuit precedents on pleading scienter. The
committee report explained:
The courts of appeals have interpreted Rule 9(b) in different ways, creating
distinctly different pleading standards among the circuits.
The Committee does not adopt a new and untested pleading standard that
would generate additional litigation. Instead, the Committee chose a uniform
standard modeled upon the pleading standard of the Second Circuit. Regarded
as the most stringent pleading standard, the Second Circuit requires that the
plaintiff plead facts that give rise to a "strong inference" of defendant's
fraudulent intent. The Committee does not intend to codify the Second
Circuit's case law interpretinB this pleading standard, although courts may find
this body of law instructive. 9

As reported by the Banking Committee, S. 240 would have added a
new section 36 substantially similar to the text eventually enacted as
section 21D(b):
SEC. 36. REQUIREMENTS FOR SECURITIES FRAUD ACTIONS
(a) MISLEADING STATEMENTS AND OMISSIONS. - In any private
action arising under this title in which the plaintiff alleges that the defendant (I) made an untrue statement of a material fact; or
(2) omitted to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in the light of the circumstances in which they were made, not
misleading; the complaint shall specify each statement alleged to have been
misleading, the reason or reasons why the statement is misleading, and, if an
allegation regarding the statement or omission is made on information and
belief, the plaintiff shall set forth all information on which that belief is formed.
(b) REQUIRED STATE OF MIND. - In any private action arising under
this title in which the plaintiff may recover money damages only on proof that
the defendant acted with a particular state of mind, the plaintiff's complaint
shall, with respect to each act or omission alleged to violate this title,
specifically allege facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted
with the required state of mind. 280

According to the Senate Report, the "strong inference of scienter"
language came from Second Circuit precedents. 281 From Rule 9(b),

s.

279. S. REP. No. 98, 104th Cong. 15 (1995).
280. S. 240, 104th Cong. (1995). In summary, the Committee report explained:
Section I 04(b) amends the 1934 Act by adding a new Section 36, establishing
pleading standards for Section I 0(b) actions alleging untrue statements or
omissions of a material fact. The complaint must specifically identify each
misleading statement and the reason or reasons why it is misleading. In any
private action to recover money damages, the plaintiff must, for each
misstatement or omission, specifically allege facts giving rise to a strong
inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind.
REP. No. 98, at 26.
281. S. REP. No. 98, I 04th Cong., 15 (1995).
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and the case law interpreting it, came the GlenFed requirement that
"[t]he plaintiff ... specifically identify each statement alleged to have
been misleading, the reason or reasons why the statement is misleading,
and, if the allegation is made on information and belief, the plaintiff
must set forth all information in plaintiff's possession on which the
belief is formed." 282
The clear adoption of Second Circuit pleading standards pleased the
SEC and the White House. On June 21, 1995, the SEC informed the
0MB that "[t]he Commission supports, or does not oppose, the measures
set forth in Section 104, 'Requirements for Securities Fraud Actions. "'283 The Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, on June 23, 1995, issued a Statement of Administration Policy announcing that "S. 240 is now a substantial improvement
on H.R. 1058, which the Administration could not support."284 It
noted that S.240 "adopts several sensible provisions, including a
workable pleading standard taken from the Second Circuit."285
Although the SEC and administration urged other modifications to the
bill,286 adoption of the Second Circuit pleading standard met with
·approval from the executive branch.

d.

Senator Arlen Specters Proposed Amendment

Section 240 was debated by the Senate and amended in June,
1995.287 Although all agreed that S. 240's text drew the "strong
inference" standard from the Second Circuit case law, Senator Arlen
Specter proposed an amendment intended to further clarify the phrase by

282. Id.
283. SEC Response to 0MB Request for Views of the Securities And Exchange
Commission Regarding S.240, "Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995" I
(June 21, 1995) (copy on file with authors).
284. Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget,
Statement of Administration Policy on S.240--Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
of 1995 1 (June 23, 1995).
285. Id.
286. See SEC Response to 0MB Request for Views of the Securities And Exchange
Commission Regarding S.240, "Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995" 3-5
(June 21, 1995) (copy on file with authors); Executive Office of the President, Office of
Management and Budget, Statement of Administration Policy on S.240--Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 1-2 (June 23, 1995) (urging modifications to
"safe harbor" and proportionate liability provisions, and addition of provisions extending
the limitations period for private actions and restoring liability for aiding and abetting
securities violations).
287. 141 CONG. REC. S8885-S8924, S8935-S8943 (daily ed. June 22, 1995); 141
CONG. REc. S8966-S8990 (daily ed. June 23, 1995), 141 CONG. REC. S9032-9087,
S9089-9097 (daily ed. June 26, 1995), 141 CONG. REc. S9109-9!85 (daily ed. June 27,
1995); 141 CONG. REC. S9199-S9226, S9318-9322 (daily ed. June 28, 1995).
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restating other language from Second Circuit case law in the text of the
statute. 288 Specifically, Senator Specter proposed adding the following
language to expressly define how a "strong inference" of scienter might
be raised:
[A] strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind
may be established either {A) by alleging facts to show that the defendant had both motive and
opportunity to commit fraud; or
(B) by alleging facts that constitute strong circumstantial evidence of
conscious misbehavior or recklessness by the defendant. 289

Senator Specter explained that by adding the "strong inference"
phrase, "what the draftsmen have done is gone to the Court of Appeals
for the [S]econd [C]ircuit, and they have drafted a type of pleading
requirement which was articulated by the chief judge of the court of
appeals by the name of John Newman."290 Senator Specter told his
colleagues that the Second Circuit standard is "the toughest standard
around and that is fine." 291 He said the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals established guidelines for what would give rise to an inference
of scienter so that plaintiffs would not have to guess what the standard
meant. 292
In Beck v. Manufacturers Hanover Tr. Co., 293 Judge
Newman's opinion for the court held:
A common method for establishing a strong inference of scienter is to allege
facts showing a motive for committing fraud and a clear opportunity for doing
so. Where motive is not apparent, it is still possible to plead scienter by
identifying circumstances indicating conscious behavior by the defendant,
though the strength of the circumstantial allegations must be correspondingly
greater. 294

Senator Specter explained that the purpose of his amendment was to
incorporate the terminology Judge Newman used in Beck when he
"posed this very tough standard [for] pleading."295 However, Senator

288. 141 CONG. REC. S9170 {daily ed. June 27, 1995).
289. Id.
290. 141 CONG. REC. S9171 (daily ed. June 27, 1995) (statement of Sen. Specter).
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. 820 F.2d 46, 50 (2d Cir. I987).
294. Id. at S9171 (statement of Sen. Specter) (quoting Beck v. Manufacturers
Hanover Tr. Co., 820 F.2d 46, 50 (2d Cir. 1987)).
295. Id. (statement of Sen. Specter). Senator Specter further commented: "What 1
am trying to do in this amendment is simply complete the picture and have in the statute
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Specter's amendment failed to indicate that less particularity was
required when plaintiffs could allege motive and opportunity. Because
the Senate Banking Committee's report stated that the committee had
chosen "a uniform standard modeled upon the pleading standard of the
(S]econd [C]ircuit," Senator Specter was puzzled by the committee's
further assertion that it did not "intend to codify the [S]econd [C]ircuit's
case law interpreting this pleading standard."296 His proposed amendment would "complete the picture ... so that people know what they are
to do on the pleading."297
Senator Bennett, who served on the Senate Banking Committee when
it adopted the "strong inference" language298-and who would later
serve as a Manager of the Conference Committee299---responded that
the Committee did want to codify the Second Circuit standard, but that
it "intentionally did not provide language to give guidance on exactly
what evidence would be sufficient to prove facts giving rise to a strong
inference of fraud. " 300 He explained:
[The committee] felt that with the [S]econd [C]ircuit standard being written
into the bill, it was best to stop at that point and allow the courts then the
latitude that would come beyond that point. 301

The next day, on June 28, 1995, Senator Specter again urged
amendment of the pleading provision, explaining that the amendment
accepts "the very stringent standard of the (S]econd [C]ircuit on pleading
to show state of mind, and then it adds to the legislation the way the
[S]econd [C]ircuit says you can allege the necessary state of mind." 302
Senator D' Amato, who had chaired the Senate Banking Committee and
submitted its report on the "strong inference" language 303-and who
would later serve as a Manager of the Conference Committee304-argued that Senator Specter's amendment, would "place too
great a burden on plaintiffs" by limiting the ways in which scienter
could be demonstrated:
this standard so that people know what they are to do on the pleading." Id.
296. Id. at S9171 (statement of Sen. Specter) (quoting S. REP. No. 98, 104th Cong.,
I st Sess. ( 1995) ).
297. Id. at S9171 (statement of Sen. Specter). Specifically, Senator Specter stated:
"[I]t is one thing for the committee to say that they are not adopting a new and untested
pleading standard, but it is only halfway if it dues not put into the statute but leaves
open the question of how you meet this standard." Id.
298. See S. Rep. No. I 04-98, at II.
299. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369 at 13699.
300. 141 CONG. REC. S9172 (daily ed. June 27, 1995) (statement of Sen. Bennett).
301. Id.
302. 141 CONG. REC. S9200 (daily ed. June 28, 1995) (statement of Sen. Specter).
303. S. Rep. No. 104-98 at II.
304. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369 at 13699.
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S. 240 codifies the [S]econd [C]ircuit pleading standard, but this amendment
goes further, to say precisely what evidence a party may present to show a
strong inference of fraudulent intent. I think this straitjackets the court.
Having said that, I could accept referring to the court['Js interpretation, but
I think we are going too far if we adopt the language that the court referred to
because it would tie the court[']s hand by forcing it to ask that plaintiffs prove
exactly the delineated facts; alleging facts to show the defendant had both the
motive and opportunity to commit fraud and by alleging facts that constitute
strong circumstantial evidence.
To be quite candid with you, / think it places too great a burden on the
plaintiffs . . . . We tried to be balanced in setting this standard(;] that is why
we did not straitjacket the court with the language in this amendment. 3°'

Nonetheless, Senator Specter's amendment passed by a vote of 57 to
42306 and became a part of S. 240 as it passed the Senate by a vote of
70 to 29 on June 28, 1995. 307
e.

The Conference Report Statement of the Managers
Adopts the Second Circuit Standard

The legislation's proponents worked on draft conference reports, to
reconcile the House and Senate legislation, in the fall of 1995. Draft
conference reports began appearing as early as October 23, 1995.308
The language of Senator Specter's amendment already had been
dropped. 309 Moreover, the provision from the House bill, expressly
adopting the Sundstrand standard for recklessness, was not included,31°
undoubtedly because the federal decisions universally applied the
standard already.
On October 24, 1995, the House formally appointed its conferees. 311
A draft conference report dated November 9, 1995 altered the language
of the pleading requirements slightly. The requirement that a plaintiff

305. 141 CONG. REC. S9201 (daily ed. June 28, 1995) (statement of Sen. D'Amato)
(emphasis added).
306. 141 CONG. REC. S9201 (daily ed. June 28, 1995).
307. 141 CONG. REC. S9219, S9222 (daily ed. June 28, 1995).
308. Draft Conference Report, October 23, 1995 (on file with the authors).
309. Id. at 31-32. The October draft proposed a new Exchange Act section 36. To
see the text of of the proposal, see supra text accompanying note 281.
310. See id.
31 l. 141 CONG. REC. H\0690 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 1995) (appointing as conferees
from the Committee on Commerce, Representatives Bliley, Tauzin, Fields of Texas, Cox
of California, White, Dingell, Markey, Bryant of Texas, and Eshoo, and from the
Committee on the Judiciary Representatives Hyde, McCollum and Conyers).
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alleging fraud on information and belief "shall set forth all information
on which that belief is formed," 312 became "shall state with particularity all information on which that belief is formed."m The requirement
that plaintiff "specifically allege facts giving rise to a strong inference
that the defendant acted with the required state of mind," 314 became
"state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the
defendant acted with the required state of mind."315 This was done in
order to better conform the statutory text to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 9(b), in response to a letter from Judge Anthony Sirica of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit writing on behalf
of the Judicial Council of the United States. 316
On November 15, 1995, the SEC endorsed the November 9 draft in
a letter from Chairman Arthur Levitt and Commissioner Steven M.
Wallman to Senator D'Amato: "While the Commission has raised a
number of concerns about earlier versions of this legislation, we believe
the draft conference report dated November 9th responds to our principal
concems." 317 In the SEC's view, this was not a statutory text that
could be construed to abolish liability for recklessness, or to raise the
standard for pleading scienter above that of the Second Circuit precedents.
Two days later, on November 17, 1996, the Senate conferees were
formally appointed. 318 That day a third "Proposed Conference Report"
was released, 319 providing that the modified provision on pleading
standards would be codified as Exchange Act Section 21D(b). 320 The

3 I 2. See Draft Conference Report, October 23, I 995 at 3 I.
313. Draft Conference Report, November 9, 1995, at 28.
314. Draft Conference Report, October 23, 1995, at 31.
3 I 5. Draft Conference Report, November 9, 1995, at 28.
3 I 6. See 141 CONG. REc. S 19044-45 (remarks of Sen. Domenici and letter of
October 31, 1995 from Hon. Anthony Sirica to Ms. Laura Unger and Mr. Robert Giuffra
of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs). A notation to the
November 9 draft says the changes were made to "[c]onform language to make the
provision consistent with Rule 11." November 9 "Draft Conference Report" at 2.
However, the language actually parallels Rule 9(b)'s requirement that circumstances
constituting fraud be set forth "with particularity," FED. R. C1v. P. 9(b), and later floor
debate makes clear that the effort was to conform the language to Rule 9(b), in
accordance with Judge Sirica's recommendation. See, e.g., 141 CONG. REC. Sl9044-45
(remarks of Sen. Domenici).
317. Letter from Chairman Arthur Levitt and Commissioner Steven M. H. Wallman,
to Senator Alfonse D'Amato, I (Nov. 15, 1995) (on file with authors).
318. 141 CONG. REC. Sl7361 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 1995) (appointing Senators
D'Amato, Gramm, Bennett, Grams, Domenici, Sarbanes, Dodd, Kerry and Bryan as
conferees on the part of the Senate).
319. Proposed Conference Report, November 17, 1995.
320. See id. at 27-28.
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final Conference Report, and accompanying Statement of the Managers,
were submitted November 28, 1995.321
With respect to pleading standards, the Conference Committee adopted
the Senate Banking Committee's text, codifying certain aspects of the
Rule 9(b) jurisprudence and adopting the Second Circuit's "strong
inference" standard. The Statement of the Managers explained that
"[t]he Conference Committee language is based in part on the pleading
standard of the Second Circuit," and "is specifically written to conform
the language to Rule 9(b )'s notion of pleading with 'particularity. "'322
The Managers added that "[b]ecause the Conference Committee intends
to strengthen existing pleading requirements, it does not intend to codify
the Second Circuit's case law interpreting this pleading standard," 323
and endnote twenty-three states that "the Conference Report chose not
to include in the pleading standard certain language relating to motive,
opportunity, or recklessness," 324 which had been proposed for inclusion
by Senator Arlen Specter. 325
Because the "safe harbor" provision requires actual knowledge for
some forward-looking statements, section 21D(b)(4) could not simply
codify the Second Circuit case law or "include in the pleading standard
certain langua§e [from the cases] relating to motive, opportunity, or
recklessness. " 3 6 For section 21 D(b)(4) to codify a "strong inference
of recklessness" pleading standard from Second Circuit case law would
have conflicted with section 21E(c)(l)(B)'s increased requirement of
"actual knowledge" for certain forward-looking statements. Neither
could section 21D(b)(2) codify all of the Second Circuit "motive and
opportunity" case law as a single pleading standard for all section IO(b)
cases. Sometimes motive and opportunity raise an inference only of
recklessness----as where an accountant or corporate officer has reason to
recklessly turn a blind eye to wrongdoing, in disregard of actual truth or

321. 141 CONG. REC. Hl3692 (daily ed. Nov. 28 1995).
322. H.R. REP. No. 369, 104th Cong., at 41, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730,
740 (Statement of Managers). The Statement adds: "Regarded as the most stringent
pleading standard, the Second Circuit requirement is that the plaintiff state facts with
particularity, and that these facts, in turn, must give rise to a 'strong inference' of the
defendant's fraudulent intent." Id.
323. Id.
324. Id. at 48 n.23, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 747.
325. 141 CONG. REC. S9170 (daily ed. June 27, 1995).
326. H.R. REP., No. 369, at 48 n.23 reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 747 (1995)
(Statement of the Managers).
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falsity. Thus, if section 21D(b)(2) expressly adopted Second Circuit case
law that permits a showing of sci enter based on "motive, opportunity, or
recklessness," it would have undermined the "actual knowledge"
requirement for forward-looking statements.
Instead of adopting all of the Second Circuit decisions without regard
to the standard of scienter that ultimately must be proved, Congress
provided that plaintiffs need only "state with particularity facts giving
rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state
of mind. " 327 That state of mind is "actual knowledge" for cases within
section 2l(E)(c)(l)(B)'s safe harbor, and recklessness for all others.
Congress did not seek to abolish motive, opportunity, and recklessness as means of establishing scienter in cases where liability is not
based exclusively on forward-looking statements, and no one believed
the Conference Report eliminated liability for reckless conduct. The
Statement of the Managers itself says exactly the opposite: "In applying
the 'fair share' rule of proportionate liability to cases involving nonknowing securities violations, the Conference Committee explicitly
determined that the legislation should make no change to the state of
mind requirements of existing /aw." 328 The Conference Report provision on proportionate liability under the Securities Act and Exchange
Act, the Managers explained, "provides that the standard of liability in
any such action should be determined by the pre-existing, unamended
provision that creates the cause of action, without regard to this
provision, which applies solely to the allocation of damages."329 For
section lO(b) actions, other than those based exclusively on "forwardlooking statements," this would include recklessness. 330
Senator
Moseley-Braun observed that while "the original House bill abolished
liability for reckless conduct[,] the Senate bill did not, and the Senate
position prevailed in conference."331 Representative Bliley, who served
as Manager for the House on the Conference Committee, confirmed that
with the exception of the safe-harbor and proportionate-liability
provisions, "[t]he conference report is careful not to change standards of
liability under the securities laws." 332

327. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b) (1995).
328. H.R. REP. No. 369, at 38, reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. at 737. (1995) (Statement
of the Managers) (emphasis added).
329. Id. (emphasis added).
330. See supra notes 133- I 36 and accompanying text.
331. 141 CONG. REC. Sl7984 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1995) (statement of Sen. MoseleyBraun).
332. 141 CONG. REc., Hl4040 (daily ed. Dec. 6, 1995) (statement of Rep. Bliley)
(emphasis added).
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While some of the legislation's opponents were troubled by the
Statement of the Managers----fearing that it might be misinterpreted as
calling for a more-demanding pleading standard than the Second Circuit
precedents----the Conference Committee Managers themselves uniformly
understood the Conference Report to adopt its pleading standard from
the Second Circuit case law. Senator Dodd explained that the Committee Mana~ers had "adopt[ed] the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
standard." 33 The Conference Report therefore contrasted with the
earlier House Bill, which had "established pleading standards that were
so high ... that it would have been impossible to bring a suit ... had
the [earlier] House language been adopted." 334 "This legislation,
therefore, is using a pleadings standard that has been successfully tested
. . . in the real world. " 335
Senator Domenici similarly explained that "the conference report
adopts the pleading standard utilized by the [S]econd [C]ircuit [C]ourt
of [A]ppeals, where a large number of securities fraud lawsuits are
brought." 336 Among its advantages was the body of precedent applying the "strong-inference" standard: "This court-tested standard requires
plaintiffs to plead facts in their complaint which give rise to a strong
inference of securities fraud." 337 Senators Dodd and Domenici had
authored this, "the Dodd-Domenici bill," they had shepherded it through
Congress, and then served as Managers for the Senate on the Conference
Committee. Other members of the Conference Committee agreed with
them that the statute codified a pleading standard from the Second
Circuit case law, even if it did not specifically codify particular decisions. 338

333.
334.

141 CONG. REC. SI7959 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1995) (statement of Sen. Dodd).
141 CONG. REC. SI7959 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1995) (statement of Sen. Dodd);
see also 141 CONG. REC. S 17957 (Dec. 5, 1995) ("The conference report clarifies current
requirements that lawyers should have some facts . . . to back up their assertion of
security fraud by adopting most of the reasonable standards established by the U.S.
Second Circuit Court of Appeals.") (statement of Sen. Dodd); 141 CONG. REc. S17959
(daily ed. Dec. 5, 1995) (the conferees intended to "adopt the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals standard") (statement of Sen. Dodd).
335. 141 CONG. REC. Sl7957 (daily ed. Dec. S, 1995) (statement of Sen. Dodd).
336. 141 CONG. REC. S\7969 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1995) (statement of Sen.
Domenici).
337. 141 CONG. REC. S\7969 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1995) (statement of Sen.
Domenici).
338. Senator Grams, who served with Dodd and Domenici on the Conference
Committee as a Manager for the Senate, confirmed that the legislation provided for
"[c]odification of the pleading standard adopted by the [S]econd [C]ircuit [C]ourt of
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When Senator Specter asked if the Conference Report repudiated
Second Circuit case law, Senator Dodd told him that it did not: "Basically, what we intended to do here was to codify the [S]econd [C]ircuit's
pleadings standards, not to indicate disapproval of each individual case
that came before it."339 He added that courts would be free to follow
the Second Circuit case law, explaining that, although "the committee
does not intend . . . to codify the [S]econd [C]ircuit's case law
interpreting this pleading standard, ... courts may find this body [of]
law instructive." 340 Senator Dodd elaborated, explaining:
[I]nstead of trying to take each case that came under the [S]econd [C]ircuit, we
are trying to get to the point where we would have well-pleaded complaints.
We are using the standards in the [S]econd [C]ircuit in that regard, then letting
the courts---as these matters wilHest. They can then refer to specific cases,
the [S]econd [C]ircuit, [or] otherwise, to determine if these standards are [met]
based on facts and circumstances in a particular case. That is what we are
trying to do here. 341

Other legislators took the Managers at their word. Senator MoseleyBraun concluded that although "[i]n the area of pleading, the House bill
[had] adopted a standard that was significantly higher than the [S]econd
[C]ircuit standard, which was the standard adopted in the Senate bill,"
it was "[t]he Senate position [that] prevailed at conference."342 Both
Senator Hatch and Senator Dole agreed that "the legislation adopts the
Second Circuit pleading standard." 343 Only the bill's opponents
doubted that.
f

President Clinton s Veto and the Veto-Override Debate

The Statement of the Managers was not as clear as its authors might
have hoped. President Clinton "took the unusual step of citing

[A]ppeals." 141 CONG. REC. 17993 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1995) (statement of Sen. Grams).
Another Conference Committee Manager, Senator D' Amato, explained that the
Conference Report "creates a uniform standard for complaints that alleged securities
fraud," and that "[t]his standard is already the law in New York," which is in the Second
Circuit. 141 CONG. REc. SI7934 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1995) (statement of Sen. D'Amato).
"It requires a plaintiff to plead facts giving rise to a strong inference of the defendant's
fraudulent intent." CONG. REC. Sl7934 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1995) (statement of Sen.
D'Amato).
339. 141 CONG. REC. Sl7960 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1995) (statement of Sen. Dodd).
340. Id.
341. Id.
342. 141 CONG. REC. Sl7984 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1995)(statement of Sen. MoseleyBraun).
343. 141 CONG. REC. S17966, Sl7983 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1995) (statements of Sen.
Hatch and Sen. Dole).
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nonbinding report language as a reason for his veto" of the bill,344
fearing that the Statement of the Managers might be construed to impose
a more demanding standard for pleading scienter than that adopted by
the Second Circuit case law. 345 However, contrary to Silicon Graphics, nothing he said suggested he believed either the bill's text or the
Statement of the Managers abolished liability for reckless misconduct.346
Moreover, the veto-override debate confirms that the bill's proponents
did not intend to do away with the Second Circuit standard---they
intended to adopt it. Representative Lofgren, for example, explained:
"The President says he supports the [S]econd [C]ircuit standard for
pleading. So do I. That is what is included in this bill." 347 Senator
Domenici stated: "The President objected to the pleading standard. Yet
it is the Second Circuit's pleading standard." 348 Whatever it meant, far

344. House, Senate Quickly Override Veto of Bill Limiting Lawsuits, 53 CONG. Q.
3879, 3880 (1995).
345. In his December I 9, I 995, veto message, President Clinton explained:
I believe that the pleading requirements of the Conference Report with regard
to a defendant's state of mind impose an unacceptable procedural hurdle to
meritorious claims being heard in Federal courts. I am prepared to support the
high pleading standard of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit-the highest pleading standard of any Federal circuit court. But the
conferees make crystal clear in the Statement of Managers their intent to raise
the standard even beyond that level. I am not prepared to accept that.
The conferees deleted an amendment offered by Senator Specter and
adopted by the Senate that specifically incorporated Second Circuit case law
with respect to pleading a claim of fraud. Then they specifically indicated that
they were not adopting Second Circuit case law but instead intended to
"strengthen" the existing pleading requirements of the Second Circuit. All this
shows that the conferees meant to erect a higher barrier to bringing suit than
any now existing--one so high that even the most aggrieved investors with the
most painful losses may get tossed out of court before they have a chance to
prove their case.
Veto Message of President William J. Clinton (Dec. I 9, I 995).
346. See id.
347. 141 CONG. REC. Hl5219 (daily ed. Dec. 20 1995) (statement of Rep. Lofgren).
348. 141 CONG. REC. Sl9150 (daily ed. Dec. 22, 1995) (statement of Sen.
Domenici); see also 141 CONG. REC. Sl9066 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1995) (statement of
Sen. Dodd). Senator Domenici placed in the Congressional Record a document
summarizing his understanding of the Conference Committee Report's provisions:
Second [C]ircuit pleading standard becomes the uniform rule. - Same as
Senate-passed bill; Senator Specter's amendment deleted from conference
report.
The objective: . . . To codify the requirements in the 2nd Circuit.
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from controlling interpretation of section 21D(b)(2), language in the
Statement of Managers should not affect the statute's meaning: "We
know we are going to have the Second Circuit standard applied, and that
in fact when legislation is at variance with legislative history or report
language, that it is the bill itself that prevails." 349 Representative
Deutsch, as a member of the Conference Committee, rose to declare that
"[r]eport language has no effect on the bill."350 Senator Domenici
agreed: "A statement of the managers is not law, everyone knows
that." 351 The bill's proponents were mystified that the President would
veto a bill on the basis of a legislative history that could not contradict
its clear terms:
Now, the Constitution gives the President the authority to veto legislation, but
nowhere does it give the President authority to veto legislative history. I think
a veto on the grounds of legislative histo7 in this case is extreme, especially
in light of the clear language of the bill."

Senator Bradley, in particular, rejected contentions that the Conference Committee Report might impose a higher pleading standard than
the Second Circuit precedents:
Now much has been made of the exact specifications surrounding the pleading
standard in the bill. A number of critics contend that it goes beyond the
already stringent standards of the {Sjecond [C}ircuit--and would have the
effect of closing the courthouse door for many small plaintiffs. Ambiguities in
the statement of managers have served only to heighten these criticisms. In
fact. the language of the bill does codify the [S}econd [C}ircuit standard in
part-and the statement of managers says so.
But even within the [S]econd [C]ircuit, there are varying interpretations of
the standard. That is why the conference report deliberately rejects a complete
codification of the [S]econd [C]ircuit and adopts language which is substantially
similar to the language of the Senate-passed bill and its report language. 353

Senator Dodd complained that the Specter amendment, by allowing
recklessness to raise a strong inference of scienter in all cases, would
undermine the requirement of actual knowledge for some claims: "[T]he

A complaint should outline the facts supporting the lawsuit. ... Under the
Conference Agreement, the complaint must set forth the facts supporting each
of the alleged misstatements or omissions and must include facts that give rise
to a "strong inference" of scienter or intent. ... This is a codification of the
2nd Circuit rule.
141 CONG. REC. Sl9151 (daily ed. Dec. 22, 1995).
349. 141 CONG. REC. H15218 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1995) (statement of Rep. Moran).
350. 141 CONG. REC. H15220 (daily ed.Dec. 20, 1995) (statement of Rep. Deutsch).
351. 141 CONG. REC. S19045 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1995) (statement of Sen.
Domenici).
352. 141 CONG. REC. S19054 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
353. 141 CONG. REC. Sl9149 (daily ed. Dec. 22, 1995) (statement of Sen. Bradley)
(emphasis added).
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Specter amendment . . . was an effort to get recklessness in" section
21D(b) as a pleading standard for all section lO(b) claims, "which
would have changed the standard from the [S]econd [C]ircuit"354 as
formulated in the Senate Report. But Senator Dodd did not believe the
Conference Report changed the Second Circuit standards for raising an
inference of scienter from allegations of motive and opportunity or
recklessness. Far from it.
According to the bill's leading proponent, "motive" would provide
the necessary "strong inference" of scienter. 355 In debate on the veto
override, Senator Dodd quoted Stanford University Professor Joseph
Grundfest----a former SEC commissioner----as "one of the most knowledgeable people in this particular area," for his opinion that under "the
securities litigation conference report, the pleading standard is faithful to
the Second Circuit's test."356 Dodd and Grundfest assured Congress
that this "'pleading standard articulated by the Second Circuit of Appeals
is intended simply to require the plaintiff to allege facts sufficient to give
rise to a strong inference of motive to defraud. "'357 Senator Dodd
explained: "We have clearly established the standard of alleging facts
with particularity, showing a strong inference of motive." 358
Dodd condemned Senator Specter's amendment, which had sought to
insert specific language about motive, opportunity, and recklessness, 359
not for incorporating the guidance of Second Circui~recedents on these
points, but for deviating from those precedents. 3
He and Senator
Reid both quoted Professor Grundfest's conclusion that "the Specter
amendment language . . . was an incomplete and inaccurate codification
of case law in the circuit."361 Senator Dodd explained:

354. 141 CONG. REC. SI9071 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1995) (statement of Sen. Dodd).
355. 141 CONG REC. SI9067 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1995) (statement of Sen. Dodd).
356. 141 CONG. REC. Sl9067 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1995) (statement of Sen. Dodd,
quoting letter of Professor Joseph Grundfest).
357. 141 CONG. REC. Sl9067 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1995) (statement of Sen. Dodd,
quoting letter of Joseph Grundfest).
358. 141 CONG. REC. Sl9068 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1995) (statement of Sen. Dodd)
(emphasis added).
359. See 141 CONG. REC. S9170 (daily ed. June 27, 1995).
360. See 141 CONG. REC. S9170-71 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1995) ("The Specter
amendment said he was codifying the guidance in the [S]econd [C]ircuit and that is not
the case."). Dodd had earlier argued that Senator Specter's amendment was an
incomplete statement of Second Circuit law. See infra note 364 and accompanying text.
361. 141 CONG. REC. SI9067 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1995) (statement of Sen. Dodd);
see also 141 CONG. REC. Sl9084 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1995) (statement of Sen. Reid,
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Where motive is apparent, you do not have to make any a/legations of a lot of
circumstances. If you have a clear motive, you do not have to worry about the
circumstances or the alleged strong facts. Where you do not have motive,
apparently, and that can be a case where it is hard to get at that motive, then
you are going to allege circumstances. There Judge Newman says, "Where
motive is not apparent, it is still possible to plead scienter by identifying
circumstances indicating conscious behavior by the defendant, though the
strength of the circumstantial allegations must be correspondingly greater."
Greater. The Specter amendment does not distinguish at all between [when
motive is and is not apparent] ... [He} therefore did not really follow the
guidance o[, the [S]econd [C}ircuit. So that is the reason that amendment was
taken out. 3 2

Dodd explained that, far from foreclosing reliance on Second Circuit
precedent, the Conference Committee actually expected courts to look
to that court's decisions for guidance:
You could have gone in, I suppose, and said why did you not include the other
language [from the Second Circuit precedents] here? The problem was, in a
sense, by codifying [judicial] guidance you get into an area where you can get
some differences of opinion on this. And arguably it could have, I suppose,
gone back and included all of it, but the decision was to take it out on the
assumption that the courts will look to the guidance. 363

Dodd believed that the Second Circuit's guidance would be followed
because the standard was established in the statute. 364 He explained:
We have met the [S]econd [C]ircuit standard here, as indicated by the
memorandum from Judge Grundfest .... We have met that standard. We have
left out the guidance. That does not mean you disregard it. 36'

Indeed, Senator Dodd observed that "the suggestion that somehow the
courts are going to disregard the guidance because it is no longer in the
bill itself, it has not been codified, I think overstates the case. " 366

IV.

CONCLUSION

Exchange Act section 21D(b) combines the Ninth Circuit's standard
for pleading falsity and the Second Circuit's standard for pleading
scienter into a single national standard for pleading securities fraud under
the Exchange Act. By requiring plaintiffs to raise "a strong inference of
the required state of mind," Congress did not intend to increase the
quoting Professor Grundfest).
362. 141 CONG. REC. Sl9068 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1995) (statement of Sen. Dodd)
(emphasis added) (quoting Beck v. Manufacturers Hanover Tr. Co., 820 F.2d at 50)
(emphasis added).
363. 141 CONG. REC. Sl9068 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1995) (statement of Sen. Dodd).
364. 141 CONG. REC. S 19068 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1995).
365. 141 CONG. REc. Sl9068 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1995) (statement of Sen. Dodd).
366. 141 CONG. REC. Sl9071 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1995) (statement of Sen. Dodd).
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required state of mind or to cast doubt on the continued validity of
Second Circuit precedents holding that plaintiffs may raise a strong
inference of scienter with allegations of motive and opportunity or by
pleading facts suggesting conscious wrongdoing or reckless disregard.
Congress considered doing away with liability for reckless misconduct,
but chose only to limit liability for reckless violations and to require
knowing conduct only for certain forward-looking statements.
The Statement of the Managers does not support a contrary conclusion. Although President Clinton believed the Statement of the
Managers indicated that the Conference Committee intended to impose
a pleading standard more demanding than the Second Circuit's, the
legislative history conclusively demonstrates that the bill's proponents
did not intend this. The veto-override debate shows that Congress
intended, in fact, to enact the Second Circuit standard, and the bill's
leading proponents specifically endorsed motive and opportunity as
means of establishing scienter.
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